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This thesis traces the origins of NATO's out-of-area debate and
suggests that the Middle East was a major strategic concern from
the outset. However, NATO has been unable to formulate a common
security policy to protect Western interests in the Middle East.
The thesis suggests that out-of-area contingencies in the Middle
East might be dealt with more effectively through United States-
Western European Union (WEU) cooperation than under NATO auspices
.
This assessment is made in view of the successful ad hoc co-
ordination of Western naval operations in the 1987-1988 "Tanker
War" and in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Cooperation between
the United States and the WEU, both pillars of NATO, seems to be
more practical politically than through NATO itself. The thesis
concludes that the allies concerned must develop improved
institutional links between the WEU and NATO in order to respond to
future contingencies beyond Europe. In this way the United States
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The "out -of -area" problem of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has been controversial since the founding
of the alliance. Despite this long historical debate, no
resolution to the problem has evolved, as was evident after
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet the Middle East area
is one in which a unified Western politico-military position
might be most urgently and immediately required in the
interests of effective action. Major Western countries have
historically demonstrated a great deal of interest in the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from NATO's beginning to the
present
.
This thesis examines the West's strategic interests in the
Middle East by investigating three major aspects of the
subject: 1) the out-of-area debate in the formative years of
NATO and arguments of the Parties over the territorial scope
of the Treaty; 2) the effects of selected major Middle East
conflicts on NATO members, namely the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis,
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and Western naval operations in 1987-
1988 (the "Tanker War") during the Iran-Iraq war and in the
1990-1991 Persian Gulf war; and 3) potential military
cooperation between the United States and the WEU as a
possible partial answer to NATO's geostrategic concerns in the
Middle East.
The thesis concludes that, in view of the history of this
problem, it is unlikely that NATO will be able to agree on the
vi
conduct of out-of -Europe security operations in the future.
Indeed, the historical record suggescs that NATO's co-
ordination of out-of-area operations might well cause a
recurrence of past transatlantic differences. Responding to
out-of-area challenges with a partnership between the United
States and the WEU seems to be a more politically practical
measure than trying to adapt NATO to this purpose. This
approach to addressing Western security concerns in the Middle
East was quite successful in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991.
Because of the sharp political differences within the
Atlantic Alliance about the use of NATO in contingencies
beyond Europe, it would seem prudent to develop further a
vehicle that was used successfully on two separate occasions,
that is, the United States-WEU ad hoc cooperation in the
Middle East during the 1987-1988 "Tanker War" and the 1990-
1991 Persian Gulf War. Cooperation between the United States
and the WEU, both pillars of NATO, seems to be more practical
politically than through NATO itself. The allies concerned
must develop improved institutional links between the WEU and
NATO in order to respond to future contingencies beyond
Europe. In this way the United States and the WEU can utilize




The "out -of -area problem of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has been controversial since the founding
of the alliance. Despite this long historical debate, no
resolution to the problem has evolved, as was evident after
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet the Middle East' area
is one in which a unified Western politico-military position
might be most urgently and immediately required in the
interests of effective action. Major Western countries have
historically demonstrated a great deal of interest in the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from NATO's beginning to the
present
.
This thesis examines the West's strategic interests in the
Middle East by investigating three major aspects of the
subject: 1) the out-of-area debate in the formative years of
NATO and arguments of the Parties over the territorial scope
of the Treaty; 2) the effects of selected major Middle East
conflicts on NATO members, namely the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis,
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and Western naval operations in 1987-
1988 (the "Tanker War") during the Iran-Iraq war and in the
:The terms Middle East and Persian Gulf will be used
interchangeably in this work. The former emerged in an
attempt to define a single strategic theater for the region
The term Middle East will be defined as Israel and the
predominantly Moslem States in North Africa, the Arabian
Peninsula, and Southwest Asia.
1990-1991 Persian Gulf war; and 3) potential military
cooperation between the United States and the WEU as a
possible partial answer to NATO's geostrategic concerns in the
Middle East.
One of the initial hypotheses to be tested is that the
out-of-area debate began with the formation of NATO and that
the Middle East was a major strategic concern from the outset.
Another hypothesis to be investigated is that the majority of
NATO governments have security interests in the Middle East.
The thesis examines the growing role of the Western European
Union (WEU) in the European Community, in view of the December
1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union.
One of the questions to be answered in this thesis is
whether the WEU might be a partial answer in promoting co-
operation between the projected European political union and
NATO. Based on this premise, joint United States-WEU
politico-military ventures outside the NATO area could be
possible. On the other hand, several members of the Atlantic
Alliance might decide not to participate in such operations
because of the North Atlantic Treaty limitations regarding the
geographical zone of application. Other factors might also be
important in dissuading some allies from intervention, such as
domestic politics or oil dependency. For these reasons, NATO
is probably not the most politically promising vehicle for
these types of campaigns
.
This thesis argues that another option muse be sought to
protect the West's interests in the Middle East, and it
proposes the possibility of encouraging the United States and
the WEU to work together to resolve such issues in the future.
Another possibility might be more systematic preparation for
ad hoc action by the allies most likely to be politically and
militarily disposed to intervene in the Middle East —the
United States, France, Britain and possibly Italy.
In short, one of the hypotheses to be examined is that the
majority of NATO governments have security concerns in at
least one portion of the world outside Europe, and that common
denominator is the Middle East. In view of this premise,
joint politico-military ventures should be possible. Yet
several members of the Atlantic Alliance would refrain from
joint military actions in the Middle East because of various
factors, such as Treaty limitations, domestic political
influences, and oil dependency. These factors and others are
discussed in this thesis to determine if the national security
concerns of the nations under discussion are such that a non-
NATO framework is more politically practical than NATO. For
this reason, one could argue, NATO is not the vehicle for
these types of campaigns, and another option must be sought to
protect the West's interests in this area. Perhaps the
answer in settling NATO's out-of-area dilemma is the
possibility of the United States and the WEU working together
to meet such challenges in the future.
II. THE ORIGINS OF NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEM
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the origins of
NATO's "out—of—area" problem from the formation of the
Brussels pact to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) . This analysis will reveal that the out-
of-area problem has existed since the conception of the
Atlantic Alliance. In the formative years of NATO the
original architects envisaged a world—wide regional defensive
pact that would essentially establish a strategic "hold line"
against Soviet aggression. This original idea of
"containment" was a grand conception; but it was considered a
difficult system to achieve. Consequently, it was decided
that a regional defensive pact between North America and
Western Europe should be concluded instead.
The out-of-area problem actually started over the issue
of whether the other free countries of Europe should be
included as members of the North Atlantic Pact. This dispute
later led some of the participating governments to argue for
inclusion of certain colonial possessions too. Thus, the out-
of-area dispute was one of the major problematic issues for
the participants negotiating the Treaty.
-
-For a superb introduction to the out-of-area problem see
Marc Bentinck, "NATO's Out-Of-Area Problem," Adelphi Papers ,
No. 211, (Autumn 1986), pp. 3-66.
A. BRUSSELS PACT TO ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
The origins of the Atlantic Alliance stem from the caiJ -
of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December
1947. ; This led to informal discussions between Britain's
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and U. S. Secretary of State
George Marshall about the idea of developing a defensive pact
in Europe A' Subsequently, Bevin began to develop his concept
of a "Western Union, " wherein he pictured a defensive pact
between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries based on
the Treaty of Dunkirk . This in effect served a dual purpose
by guaranteeing France's security and establishing a formula
for a transatlantic defensive pact against the Soviet Union.
He also conceptualized Germany as a member of this pact,
because of his awareness that the real threat was the Soviet
Union
.
See Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The
Formative Years
,
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1984), p. 49. See Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 , (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 506. See also
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace
,
(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987) p. 65. For more detail about the
inability to achieve a four power resolution on the German
question see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling
Alliance
,
(Westport: CT., Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 49.
4Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic
Alliance," in American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition , ed
.
John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm ( Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1984), p. 298.
-Ibid., p. 299.
"Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
,
p. 63.
On January 13, 1948, Marshall received Bevin's summary of
his concept of a Western Union. In short, Bevin believed that
all the free countries of Europe had to form a Western
European defensive pact to maintain peace and that it needed
to be "backed by the Americas and the Dominions." Bevin
stated that this system would be comprised of Italy, Portugal,
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Greece, and if
circumstances permitted, would include Germany and Spain.
John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European
Affairs, reviewed Bevin's proposal. In his view, it was
unwise for the United States to associate itself with a
defensive pact that was modelled after the Treaty of Dunkirk.
George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, believed
that a defensive pact modelled after the Treaty of Dunkirk was
not "the best way to lead into it." : State Department
officials argued that a defensive pact modelled after the Rio
Pact would be more likely to pass in Congress because a
precedent had been established. " Prime Minister Paul—Henri
'See summary of Bevin's concepts on the formation of a
Western Union in, Foreign Relations of the United States
(henceforth FRUS) 1948, vol. 3. p. 5. See also Henrikson, The
Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance
, p. 298.
^Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance
,
p. 299. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, January 20, FRUS
1948 Vol. 3 . p. 7.
'Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance
,
p. 300. See also Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that Led
to Atlantic Alliance," Part 1, NATO Review , August 1979, pp.
11-12.
Spaak of Belgium was also opposed to a Dunkirk Treaty formula;
he believed that Russia was the greater threat to Western
Europe 's security. 1 ' Furthermore, the Benelux Governments
felt that a defensive pact based on the Dunkirk Treaty was
"narrowly conceived," and that a Rio Treaty formula provided
better guarantees." 1
The impetus for concluding the Brussels Treaty was the
collapse of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in March 1948,
coupled with communist threats in Finland, Norway, Italy,
Germany and other European areas. Europe's uneasiness spurred
Bevin to urgently submit his proposal to conclude an Atlantic
Security Pact for the Secretary of State's review. Marshal
evaluated Bevin' s plan and without consultation from his staff
favorably replied, "we are prepared to proceed at once in the
joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic Security
System." 1 ^ The "Soviet tide" seemed more real than ever, and
this resulted in the Europeans expediting the Brussels pact
^Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European
Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, January 19,
FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 6. and Theodore C. Achilles, US Role in
Negotiations that led to Atlantic Alliance , Part 1, p. 11.
•-Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a
European 1936-1966
,
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) p.
147
.
!JLetter from Secretary of State Marshal to British
Ambassador Lord Inverchapel, 12 March, in FRUS 19 48 Vol. 3. p.
48. For a description of the tension in Europe see, Sir
Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of Nato
,
(London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1982), p. 12, and Henrikson, The Creation of the
North Atlantic Alliance
, pp. 304-305.
negotiations. France was now convinced to support a
multilateral defense pact against any aggressor, and thus the
Brussels Pact was modelled after the Rio de Janeiro Treaty.'
On March 17, 1948 the Brussels Treaty was signed and
favorably received by President Truman. On this same day,
Truman addressed a joint session of Congress; he stated that
the Brussels Treaty was a positive step toward world peace.
Truman assured the Western Europeans that the United States
would provide "the support which the situation requires." He
added, "I am sure that the determination of the free countries
of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal
determination on our part to help them do so." 14
During this period the emphasis of the transatlantic
talks focused on developing some type of defensive pact within
Western Europe. Yet, it was limited to mainly five European
powers, Britain, France and the Benelux states. Bevin's idea
of having a Western Union that included all the free countries
of Europe collapsed. Because of this development the first
out-of-area dispute was over the extension of this defensive
pact in Europe. In fact, the Brussels powers were bitterly
opposed to extending the defensive pact to include other
1JHenrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance ,
pp. 302-303. See also, Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alii
ance
, p . 69 .
14Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, Documents on
American Foreign Relations Vol. X
,
(Bristol, CT: Princeton
University Press, 1950), p. 7. See also Achilles, US Role in
Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance , Part 1, p. 12.
European countries that were not covered under the Brussels
Treaty. The reasons for this fact will be examined latei
.
B. FIRST STAGE: THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ON SECURITY
Five days after the signing of che Brussels Pact
,
first intergovernmental meeting was held between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada on March 22, 1948.
French participation was excluded from the first round of
talks because the French were considered, "as a security
risk," according to Hickerson.- The reason given was the
communist party's strength in the French government, and the
consequent fear that the secret talks could be compromised."
Additionally, this permitted the United States to confer with
the British specifically on their expected role in the
alliance and Germany's possible inclusion in the Atlantic
Pact . l7
The participants in the first round of intergovernmental
talks believed that it was conceptually feasible to devise "a
'Minutes of the first meeting of the United States
—United Kingdom —Canada security conversations, March 22,
FRUS
,
1948 Vol. 3. p. 59.
•'"Stuart , Douglas and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance:
NATO Out-Of-Area Problems Since 1949
,
(Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1990), p. 183. For a complete discussion of
the communist strength in French politics between 1945-50 see,
Roger Morgan, West European Politics since 1945: The Shaping
of the European Community
,
(London: B. T. Bastsford LTD,
1973)
, pp. 46-48.
:7Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance ,
p. 183.
world-wide pact of self-defense," adhering to Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.' It was envisaged thac this
could be accomplished by establishing regional pacts world-
wide and thus essentially having a defensive "hold line"
against aggression. Hickerson noted that the hold line theory
would place the alliance in a paradoxical situation because it
would "convince an aggressor that everything outside the line
[was] vulnerable to easy aggression." This significant
statement marks the beginning of the "out-of -area" debate.
Thus by delimiting the alliance boundaries all areas outside
the territorial scope of a treaty became open to Soviet
influence. The world-wide view was plausible, but forming a
transatlantic alliance was more pragmatic and less cumbersome
than constructing a global alliance structure. After those
Talks the tripartite group recommended the following points:
• For the President to extend invitations to the United
Kingdom, France, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland,
Italy, the Benelux States, Portugal and The Netherlands to
take part in a conference on a collective defense
agreement for the North Atlantic Area.
• That a Presidential Declaration be announced stating that
an armed attack on any of the Brussels Treaty states or
free countries of Europe [would be regarded] as an armed
attack against the United States and would be dealt with
laHenrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance ,
p. 303.
""-'Minutes of the first meeting of the United States-Untied
Kingdom- Canada Security Conversations, held at Washington,
March 22, 1948. The minutes of this series of top secret
meetings, were held at the Pentagon between March 22 and April
1, FRUS 1948 Vol 3. p. 61.
10
by America in accordance with Article 51 of the Unit
Nations Charter.
• To guarantee the territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey
and Iran. Followed by a possible Middle East security
agreement including North Atlantic pact members.
• And when possible for the Western Zones of Germany,
Austria, and Spain to be considered in joining the
pact as members."
The tripartite participants fundamentally agreed that a
treaty-based formula should be the nucleus for a transatlantic
alliance.- Bevin later echoed this same position, that a
treaty-based formula was the only possible solution, as stated
in a telegram to Acting Secretary of State Lovett:
. . .we do not believe that there is any substitute for a
Treaty if something effective is to be done. A real
defence system worked out by the United States of America,
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Western European States
would affect the whole approach of the world to the peace
problem and be the first great step towards what could
ultimately become a real world collective Security System,
in accordance with the principles of the United
Nations . ~
However, to pursue this route Senate advice on this issue
was required. Senator Vandenberg v/as persuaded by Lovett and
his State Department staff to sponsor a resolution for a
-'Minutes of the Sixth meeting of the United States—
-
United Kingdom—Canada Security Conversations, held ac
Washington, April 1, 1948 FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 71-75.
21Ibid., p. 72.
--Paraphrase of a telegram from the British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) of April 9th regarding
recent talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements, FRUS
1948, Vol. 3. p. 80. Point of origin, date and addressee not
indicated on file copy. Apparently delivered to Lovett
through British Ambassador Inverchapel
.
11
"Collective Defense Agreement for the North Atlantic Area."
On June 11, 1948, the resolution was approved by the Senate.
This in essence gave the President the needed advice and
consent required to proceed with the negotiations for a North
Atlantic Pact . - ;'
What appeared to be a smooch process during the first
talks merely set the stage for incense debate over the
territorial scope of the transatlantic alliance during the
following negotiations. We will examine this debate over the
inclusion of non-Brussels pact states into the transatlantic
alliance. The issue to expand the alliance to include other
European nations triggered the out-of-area debate over Europe.
C. SECOND STAGE: THE WASHINGTON EXPLORATORY TALKS
The resumption of the "Washington Exploratory Talks" in
July 1948 moved at a purposely sluggish pace. As Achilles
explains, "The process was deliberately a leisurely one since
the US team made clear the importance it attached to avoiding
public controversy until after the Presidential election in
early November."-'1 The first session of the Ambassadors
Committee was convened by Acting Secretary of State Robert
"Tor insights into the US commitment alternatives see,
Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance
, pp. 82-114. Also
the position of the United States with respect to support for
Western Union and other related free countries in FRUS , 1948
Vol. 3. pp. 85-88. And Achilles, US Role in Negotiations that
Led to Atlantic Alliance
, Part 1, p. 13.
24Achilles, p. 13
12
Love tit, with Ambassadors from Canada and the Brussels Treaty
powers. These calks were the principal means for participants
to discuss the alliance formation. The actual negotiation of
the treaty was conducted by the "International Working Group,
"
comprised of principal assistants from each government.'"
One of the major issues that had to be resolved
immediately was the question of membership and defining what
countries should be covered in any North Atlantic security
arrangement . Director of the Working Group Charles Bohlen
said that the membership question "might be one of the most
difficult aspects of the problem, " because all the free
countries of Western Europe must be considered and, "if any
strategically important country were omitted from the group
[North Atlantic pact] criticism might be aroused in the
Congress."- The United States wanted to ensure that the
widest possible European security pact evolved and that it
included all the free countries of Western Europe.
-'See minutes of the first meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p.
148. Also first meeting of the Working Group participating in
the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 12, FRUS
1948 Vol. 3. p. 182. For a detailed explanation of both
committees' functions see Henderson, The Birth of NATO
, pp.
35-36.
-''Memorandum of the third meeting of the Working Group
participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security,
July 15, in FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 187.
13
Ostensibly, the participants in the Working Group were
faced with a complex situation, as Elizabeth Sherwood
explains
:
...in the very act of defining the precise territory of
the proposed alliance, they created potential new security
problems for themselves. For by defining what was "in-
area, " they also established an out-of-area. In so doing,
they might lead other nations to conclude that out-of-area
concerns were not of vital import to the security of the
Atlantic powers.- 7
To resolve this troubling geostrategic question the United
States Working Group had to settle its own internal disputes
on these issues first . The United States Working Group
participants were split into two major schools of thought
regarding the membership issue. They included both the
"Atlantic" and "Europe First," _b schools of thought; and
they differed on the inclusion of certain countries as members
in the North Atlantic pact. The countries in question at this
point were the "stepping-stone-states," of Norway, Portugal
(including Azores), Denmark (including Greenland), and
- 7Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global
Challenges to Western Security
,




^ 8The Atlantic term is a derivative of Stuart and Tow's,
"Global Strongpomts " school of thought category that they
place Kennan and Bohlen in. For the purposes of this paper an
Atlantic category was developed inasmuch as it clarifies their




Iceland.- In addition, the other countries under discussion
were Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Ireland, and the
Scandinavian states.
The Atlantic supporters (Kennan, Bohlenj wanted to
strictly limit the membership to countries v/hose shores were
"washed by the waters of the North Atlantic."' In a word,
membership would be founded on geographic principles cxlone.
Kennan also supported the stepping-stone concept, since chese
Atlantic islands would bridge North America to Europe. The
reason for his geographic limitations was to prevent the
United States from stretching its military resources too thin.
As Kennan explains
:
My view as to how this should be done. . .provides for two
anchors: the U.S.—Canada anchor and the Brussels Pact
anchor which would constitute the actual members of the
pact . The stepping-stone countries 'would enter into an
association with the full members of the pact whereby the
latter would guarantee them against attack, and they in
their turn would agree to make available to the members of
-'Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance
,
p. 306. See also, Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that Led
to Atlantic Alliance," NATO Review , October 1979, Part 2, p.
16. And memorandum of the ninth meeting of the Working Group
participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security,
August, 9, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 210-211.
: A phrase used by Kennan on numerous occasions in State
Department correspondence. See memorandum by the Director of
the Policy Planning Staff November 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p.
286.
^George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 192 5-19 50
,
(Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1967), p. 411.
15
the pact military facilities on their territories
.
The Atlantic school of thought would undoubtedly leave
out some significant countries in Europe, whereas the
Europe First supporters (Hickerson, Achilles, Marshall)
wanted to assure the widest European membership in the
alliance. Therefore, Hickerson supported the membership
of the same countries as Kennan, but proposed expanding
the pact to include Italy and possibly Greece and Turkey.
In fact, he emphatically advocated an open door policy for
alliance membership to all Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) states. ;;
Unquestionably, Hickerson 's view on membership differed
significantly from Kennan ' s on two points. First, Hickerson
called for Italy to be included as a member of the Brussels
Treaty, and this would in effect make Italy a member of the
alliance. Second, he held that the same association of the
stepping-stone states should be applied to the other members
of the OEEC.-'" Italy's association with the alliance was not
an easy task to accomplish because it received opposition from
all European countries. The idea to expand the Brussels pact
was a problem because the Brussels powers were strictly
"Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), August 31,




chinking of themselves. As Lawrence Kaplan explains, "The nub
of this problem seemed to be the resistance of the Western
Union initiators to share American largesse with outlying
nations .
"
The European 'Working Group participants also had differing
positions on the membership question ind the limits of the
North Atlantic Area. For example, the French argued that they
were against the idea of expanding the North Atlantic pact or
the Brussels pact to include countries such as Italy, Greece
or Turkey. However, the French and the Belgians did insist
that their African territories be included in the territorial
scope of the pact . The British and Canadians also favored
excluding Italy from an Atlantic pact. They suggested that to
include Italy while excluding Greece and Turkey would damage
both the latter countries tremendously or even worse drive
them into the Soviet sphere.
'Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance
,
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 25.
See also Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative
Years
, p. 108.
'"Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) August 31,
in FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 225. See also memorandum of the thir-
teenth meeting of the Working Group participating in the
Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, September 2, in FRUS
1948 Vol. 3. pp. 226-228. For Canada's opposition to Italy
and Greece see, minutes of the fifth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, July 9, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p.
179. For an explanation of France and Belgium's request on
African colonies see Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 55—58.
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Undoubtedly, the power players during these negotiations
were the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. This
inner-circle started back at the first round of
intergovernmental talks where it was decided to exclude
France. All major decisions were made by these countries
and sometimes just the United States decision in itself was
enough. A price had to be paid by the Europeans for the
United States acquiescence on certain matters. Ostensibly,
this unique consultation style became the "pattern in
subsequent consultations on the definition of alliance
interests beyond Europe.""3
After this intense debate on the working level a final
draft paper was submitted on September 9, 1948, to the
Ambassadors' Committee for final review. This document
provided the provisional outlines for a North Atlantic Pact.
It gave the basis for the territorial scope of a North
Atlantic security arrangement, defined its relationship to the
security of other nations and suggested articles for a treaty.
After reviewing the final draft, the Ambassadors' Committee
37Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the







38Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 16. For a description
of each member's influence and participation in the Working
Group see Henderson, The Birth of NATO
, pp. 56-60.
sent this document to their respective governments for further
evaluation
.
D. INTERIM PERIOD: REVISION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD
ITALY
In November 1948 a new perspective on Italy was devised by
Kennan that completely changed the United States policy on
Italy's inclusion as a member in the North Atlantic pact.
Kennan submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State in
late November regarding his concerns about the forthcoming
negotiations for a North Atlantic security pact . He
emphatically expressed his opinion that the pact should be
restricted to the North Atlantic area because "attempts to go
further afield and to include countries beyond that area might
have undesirable consequences."'1 " He further argued that a
logical limit to the alliance geographic boundaries must be
maintained, or it would result in the United States
overextending itself politically and militarily.'
Therefore, he unequivocally recommended the exclusion of any
-''Memorandum by the participants in the Washington
Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, submitted to their
respective governments for study and comment, September 9,
FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 237-248.
""Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Kennan), November 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 286. For detail





nation outside the scope of the North Atlantic territorial
region, namely Italy.
This analysis actually changed the United States position
by opposing full membership for Italy and supporting merely an
"association" of Italy with the North Atlantic pact. 4 " This
amounted to a great coup for the Atlantic school of thought
.
During the forthcoming negotiations in December, it seemed
that all odds were against Italy having any support for
membership in the new alliance in Europe. However, to the
surprise of the United States, France suddenly changed its
position and became Italy's sole advocate for membership in
the North Atlantic pact.
E. THIRD STAGE: DRAFTING OF THE TREATY
When the Washington Exploratory Talks reconvened on 10
December, Lovett expressed an intention to "move as rapidly as
possible" in concluding a treaty. Lovett added that the most
pressing issue for the Ambassadors' Committee was to determine
the North Atlantic pact membership and its territorial
scope. 43 Lovett tried to preempt fellow participants from
including their colonial possessions. For instance, he
specifically transmitted a telegram to Prime Minister Spaak of
42Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
,
p. 203
4iMinutes of the eighth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, December 10, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3
p. 310-311.
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Belgium, indicating that the United States opposed
inclusion of African territory in the defined area.' [n che
following week on December 22, France presented its changed
position on Italy and now supported its membership in the
alliance; additionally, France argued for its North African
provinces to be included in the territorial scope of the North
Atlantic pact. Thus, France essentially used Italy to
facilitate its argument to have another Mediterranean area
covered under the auspices of the Treaty, namely North
Africa."' As Ambassador Henri Bonnet explained:
. . .it would be extremely difficult for France to leave a
part of its metropolitan territory out of the area.
Algeria was a part of France and in the same relation to
France as Alaska or Florida to the United States."'
Surprisingly, the Belgians and the Dutch opposed the
French position." The United States remained adamant in
its objection to including any African territory in addition
to opposing Italy's membership in the alliance. The British
were sympathetic regarding France's Algerian question; in
fact, their government "had been thinking of the inclusion of
44Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to
the Embassy in Belgium, December 11, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p.
314. See Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
, p. 214.
"Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years ,
p. 110.
"Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325. see
also Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
,
p. 2 03.
47Henderson, The Birth of NATO
, p. 69
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all Africa north of latitude 30 [degrees] north," Sir Oliver
Franks said. Nonetheless, the British were still against
Italy's membership in the alliance. ~'~ The Canadians did not
support the inclusion of Italy; however, they suggested that
if Italy became a member, then France's proposition was
logical. In fact, "there would be a good case on geographical
grounds for including the Mediterranean coast of North
Africa," Ambassador Hume Wrong said. The Canadians argued
nonetheless that the fundamental premise of the North Atlantic
pact was for its membership to remain a North Atlantic one."
The Canadians, perhaps unwittingly, made a case for
France, in asserting that if Italy were included in the pact
then it would make sense to seriously consider other countries
with a Mediterranean coast. Lovett posed his final analysis
on this issue by indicating if France felt so strongly about
North Africa, France would have included it in the Brussels
Treaty. Bonnet objected to this assertion; he countered that
the Brussels Treaty was a pledge limited to an attack on any
member in Europe; however, if conflict occurred outside the
treaty area, the members would consult on the matter.
Finally, Lovett suggested that a possible solution to this
question was for the pact to extend a declaration assuring the
4oMinutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 32 6.
49 Ibid., p. 327. See also Reid, Time of Fear and Hope ,
p. 203.
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territorial integrity of Italy, North Africa, Greece and
Turkey. Those issues were taken by the Workin Iroup,
which formulated a draft of the treaty and submit- i to the
Ambassadors' Committee on December 24.
The Working Group could reach agreement on all articles
except for Article 5, which defined the area of thi proposed
pact. Article 5 had two alternative solutions to the
territorial question: alternative (a) adhered strictly to the
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; alternative
(b) included the North Atlantic, North Africa, the Western
Mediterranean, and Italy. After reviewing this draft the
Ambassadors' Committee agreed to forward this report to their
respective governments for further evaluation.
The participating governments tried earnestly to resolve
their out-of-area problem. To appease everyone, however,
short-cuts were taken to facilitate the negotiating process.
In reality, nothing was resolved on how to deal with a
possible out-of-area problem, except for the idea of
consultations if any member's "territorial integrity" was
See Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington
exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325.
And also Reid, Times of Fear and Hope
, p. 213.
'•Report of the International Working Group to the
Ambassadors' Committee, December 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp




threatened. Nonetheless, in the final phase of
negotiations each government could agree upon the
interpretation of the Treaty.
F. FOURTH AND FINAL STAGE: THE TREATY AND AGREED
INTERPRETATIONS
The Ambassadors' Committee reconvened for its final phase
of the alliance process on January 14, 1949. Their goal was
to conclude the final text of the Treaty. Lovett warned that
the two problematic issues of Algeria and Italy had to be
resolved quickly. Less urgent was the issue of extending
invitations of membership to the Scandinavian countries and
Portugal so they could conclude this process. 1
In this final phase, France changed its tactics in regard
to North Africa. France still insisted on the inclusion of
Italy; however, instead of including all of French North
Africa, it limited its demand to incorporating only the French
Departments of Algeria. This tactful development resulted in
52This is referring to Article 4 of the Treaty, see NATO
Basic Documents
,
NATO Information Service, (Brussels: 1976) p
12.
r
' 3Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, January 14, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4.
p. 27.
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only the United States and Canada remaining in opposition to
the French proposal . '
Most of the participants objected to Italy's inclusion as
a member, but were sympathetic toward France's position on
Algeria. France had a superior moral case, they argued,
because "Algeria was a part of France as Alaska to the United
States."" In a word, Algeria was constitutionally
integrated into France since 1848 and claimed as a natural
prolongation of France. Ironically, Canada and the United
States superficially protested this matter for no apparent
reason; Escott Reid, a Canadian delegate to the talks,
explained:
...we would be prepared, although reluctantly, to accept
the inclusion of the three departments of Algeria... By
January 24 the State Department had also moved to this
position. Achilles told Stone on that day 'for his own
7
"'Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance
, p. 185. See
Reid, Time of Fear and Hope




"An analogy Ambassador Bonnet used to make his case
during the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory talks.
See minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory
Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325.
Like any other French department, Algeria sent
representatives to the French parliament. France had a policy
of complete assimilation of Algeria into France. This
assimilation policy was perceived in a negative light by some
Algerians, because it discouraged use of the Arabic language,
and seemed to contradict the principle of national self-
determination. See Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs:
From the Earliest Times to the Present
,
(New York: St Martin's
Press, 1956), p. 714. See also The Ambassador in Belgium
(Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State telegram, January 7,
FRUS 1949 Vol. 4. p. 14. And Reid, Time of Fear and Hope , p.
215.
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very private ear that the United States will swallow
Algeria.' In turn Stone told Achilles — for his own very
private ear — that Canada would also swallow Algeria...
Achilles said that for various reasons they [the
Americans] wanted to let this question hang in the balance
for another five v/eeks . r
In essence, by late January the inclusion of Algeria in
the territorial scope of the Treaty was a moot issue. The
delay in telling the French merely prolonged their agony.
Dean Acheson, the new Secretary of State, said in early March
that it was now suitable for the Senate to extend the Treaty
area to include Algeria. The United States was also now open
to discussion on the Italian question. In view of this,
France pressed on with the inclusion of Italy with greater
fervor
.
At this point France was the only advocate for Italy's
membership. Italy made several attempts to sway the United
States position on its behalf for inclusion in the alliance.
In a telegram to Secretary of State Acheson, Italian
Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani candidly requested Italy's
inclusion; "The Italian Government desires to adhere to [the]
treaty at present under discussion between the
L
' 7Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
, p. 217.
rdDean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the
State Department
,
(New York: Norton and Company, 1969), p.
278. See Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance
, pp. 186-187
And Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the Washington




. .known as he Atlantic ict . " The
oppositionist's main argument against Italy was that its
military forces were insignificant and would drain I ! i nee
military resources. Moreover, this was compounded by what
critics considered a record of historical unreliability as an
alliance partner. "In two world wars Italy has shown herself
to be an . . . undependable ally, having switched sides in both
wars," said Acheson. Yet, the arguments for Italy's
inclusion were even more important because Italy had been
aligned with the West, and Italy's exclusion from this
important alliance would adversely affect the incumbent
government in future elections. Furthermore, it would increase
the Italian Communist Party's influence in Italy." -
Acheson expressed these same arguments for and against
Italy to President Truman. The Executive Branch decided to
support the inclusion of Italy as a member of the North
Atlantic Pact. This resulted in the other participating
governments supporting this position too, except for faint
'Telegram sent from the Italian Ambassador in the United
States (Tarchiani) to the Secretary of State, March 1, FRUS
1949. Vol. 4. p. 125.
Acheson, Present at the Creation
,
p. 27 9.
"'Memorandum by the Secretary of State Acheson, March 2,
FRUS 194 9 Vol. 4. p. 142.
-Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, pp. 17-18. See also
Memorandum by the Secretary of State Acheson, March 2, FRUS
1949, Vol. 4. p. 145.
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reservations by Britain. Nevertheless, it was agreed by all
to invite Italy as a signatory to the Treaty.
Resolving the membership of the Scandinavian countries was
of critical importance strategically to the alliance. Their
membership was stifled by Sweden's suggestion for a
Scandinavian defensive pact consisting of Sweden, Norway and
Denmark. 1,4 This would have been a fatal blow to the Atlantic
alliance because of the loss of strategic air and submarine
facilities, and the island possessions of Denmark (Greenland)
and Norway (Spitzbergen Archipelago) . The Joint Chiefs of
Staff believed that this type of pact was unable to deter the
Soviet Union; therefore, "it [was] extremely doubtful if
action in accordance with such a pact. . .could be successful in
preventing Soviet aggression and eventual domination." 1' 1
Moreover, a key factor for the Scandinavian defensive pact
was arms support from the United States and Britain. It was
made clear to the Scandinavian countries that no arms support
would be forthcoming from either the United States or Britain
t,3Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security March 4, FRUS 1949, Vol 4. p.
151 .
b4Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
, p. 197.
"'Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense ( Forres tal) to
the Secretary of State, February 10, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 98.
""Study on the military implications to the United Staces
of a Scandinavian Pact, in a memorandum from the Secretary of
Defense to the Secretary of State, February 10, FRUS 1949,
Vol. 4. p. 99.
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if they remained outside a North Atlantic alliance. Norway
decided to join the North Atlantic Pact in early March.
Consequently, the Scandinavian defensive pact fell apart; this
resulted in Denmark's insistence on joining the North Atlantic
pact and Sweden opting to resolve her own security
problems
.
Portugal's ascension to membership in the North Atlantic
pact was less difficult than that of the others. As
previously discussed, the Azores islands were of strategic
interest to the United States. Portugal, however, held
reservations that they were possibly being used for
convenience's sake. The alliance members made assurances that
this was not the case. Portugal also inquired if its colonial
territories would be covered by the Treaty. The Portuguese
were told that if areas outside the territorial scope of the
treaty were threatened this would warrant consultations on
these matters according to Article 4 of the Treaty. Portugal
was appeased on this matter and was willing to join the
alliance. :
For Greece and Turkey it was concluded that they should
not be invited into the alliance because it was considered
'Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
, p. 198. See Sherwood,
Allies in Crisis
, pp. 26-27. And Henderson, The Birch of
NATO, pp. 83-89.
'Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
,
p. 26. See also translated
memorandum from the Ambassador in Portugal to the Secretary of
State, March 9, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 182.
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that the boundaries would then have been extended to the
extreme. Greece, Turkey and Iran, however, were significant
strategic areas for the United States and Britain. These
countries could assist in stopping the encroachment of
communism in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
An initial proposal by the United States and Britain was to
have the North Atlantic Pact make a declaration stating that
threats in these areas would be of grave concern for the pact
.
This idea was opposed by the other members of the pact.
The United States and Britain discussed the idea of making
a joint declaration, but these proposals were also dismissed
because of their differing views on Iran. Bevin believed that
a joint declaration would cause the Soviets to possibly invoke
the 1921 Treaty with Iran and invade Azerbaijan. It was
agreed then that they would make separate declarations on this
issue. 71 On March 17, the Ambassadors' Committee, now
consisting of the eight participating states (Norway being a
participant since March 4) sent invitations to Italy,
Portugal, Denmark, and Iceland to be signatories to the
Treaty. 71
b9 Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, pp. 21-22.
70Henderson, The Birth of NATO
, pp. 105-107. See also
Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, pp. 21-24.
71 See Acheson, Present at the Creation
,
p. 279. See also
minutes of the eighteenth meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p.
223 .
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G. SIGNING OF THE TREATY: AGREEMENT NOT LIMITED TO ATLANTIC
IN VIEW OF ITS WORLD-WIDE INFLUENCE
On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic
Treaty. ' In President Truman's address during the signing
ceremonies, he had specifically mentioned that the Treaty did
not limit the United States security concerns to the Atlantic
region only, but was also significant for "the security and
welfare of other areas of the world." Britain's Foreign
Minister expressed the same opinion, that the Atlantic pact
"does not minimize either our interest or determination to
support others not included in this pact."' 4
Interestingly enough, Britain and the United States were
the only countries that made statements concerning security
problems outside the territorial scope of the Treaty. These
statements were clearly attempts to address the out-of-area
concerns of both countries. In other words, the out-of-area
problem was not resolved during the negotiating phase of the
Treaty.
"-Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years
,
p. 120.
'President Truman's address, reprinted in New York Times
,
April 5, 1949.
4Full text of Ernest Bevin's address reprinted in, New
ork Times , April 5, 1949.
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III. HISTORICAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL DISPUTES ON OUT-OF-
AREA ISSUES: TWO MIDDLE EAST CASE STUDIES
As indicated in the previous chapter the conclusion of
the North Atlantic Pact did not, by any means, resolve the
out-of-area question. Moreover, intra-NATO disputes on the
question were exacerbated by the United States implementation
of NSC-68 in 1950 and the escalation of the Cold War. As
prescribed by NSC-68, U.S "containment" efforts were expanded
through a search for global security arrangements that would,
it was hoped, curtail or contain Soviet expansionism. This
eventually led to such collective defense arrangements as the
Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) , the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) , and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO)
.
The United States was undoubtedly concerned with non-
European security issues. But the implementation of United
States policies was complicated because specific features of
its national security policies were at times burdened by
various conflicting motives. This was mainly caused by the
diverse approaches in each American presidential
administration's implementation of containment. Consequently,
the United States ability to co-ordinate out-of-area
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operations was affected by intermittent conflicts between
anti-colonialist and an ti -communist goals.
The previous chapter indicated that the strategic
interests of the West in the Middle East region were of
significant importance to the "big three" (the United States,
Britain, and France) . This point will be explained further by
discussing the "big three's" pattern of defending collective
interests in the region, and evaluating some of the reasons
for their difficulty in developing a common foreign policy and
pursuing joint Alliance action in dealing with extra-European
contingencies, particularly in the Middle East region.
Three factors will be examined that demonstrated NATO's
inability to develop a common foreign policy to defend Western
interests, specifically for the Middle East region. First, we
will discuss the problems with the consultation process among
the NATO partners. NATO clearly designed Articles 4 and 9 to
address any issue that required the attention of the allies,
particularly for territories not covered by the Washington
Treaty. These articles imply that each member has an
obligation to consult with its allies on any issue that
affects its national security and that of the allies.
'Tor historical background, see John Lewis Gaddis, The
Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War
,
(New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987 ) . See also Douglas
Stuart, " The Future of the European Alliance: Problems and
Opportunities for Coalition Strategies," Collective Security
in Europe and Asia
, ed
.
, Gary L. Guertner, (Carlisle Barracks
Pa., U.S. Army War College, 1992).
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However, the treaty does not obligate any member to defend a
territory outside NATO's geographic zone. Because of this,
the consultation process between NATO partners was typically
superseded by unilateral actions by one or more of the "big
three" members involved in out -of -area campaigns, particularly
in the selected cases examined in this thesis.
Second, we will discuss the patterns of intervention by
the NATO partners. In fact, the "big three" have intervened
repeatedly in the Middle East since NATO's formation in 1949.
This process of interventions has formed a distinct pattern
since that time. In the first twenty years of NATO the
European allies were the dominant power brokers in the Middle
East, while the United States was either a part time associate
(as in its 1958 intervention in Lebanon and Jordan when the
Western powers were trying to resist pan-Arabism and thus
protect both countries' sovereignty) or a critical bystander
(as in the 1956 Suez Crisis) . During this first stage the
Europeans repeatedly solicited American support for out-of-
area campaigns in the Middle East region. However, the
European requests typically resulted in a United States
refusal because of America's anticolonial sentiments.
By the 1973 Yom Kippur War, however, the United States and
its European allies had shifted interventionist roles. In
this second stage the United States became the major solicitor
for assistance in out-of-area campaigns, while its European
allies usually declined to participate. One of the major
34
reasons for the European retrenchment was the loss of colonies
in Africa and the withdrawal of forces from the Persian Gulf
region, particularly in the British case. This shift
interventionist roles resulted in America becoming
dominant power in protecting the security needs of the West in
the Middle East
.
Third, we will discuss the effects of U.S. anticolonial
sentiments on Alliance relations. American urgings that the
European allies decolonize became a political issue during
World War II. Anticolonial sentiment caused the U.S. to
disassociate itself from European colonial problems. This
policy of disassociation was, however, set aside if a European
ally's colonial possessions were threatened by communist
aggression. U.S. ant icolonialism nonetheless caused constant
frictions between the allies, particularly in the first twenty
years of NATO. Nevertheless, an important fact remains:
despite the allies' inability to harmonize their political
objectives in out-of -Europe contingencies, one or more of the
big three intervened repeatedly in the Middle East in defense
of perceived security interests.
With this history in mind, the question is posed: should
NATO assume an additional role in protecting the West's
interests in the Middle East? To illustrate NATO's historical
problems in this domain, we will examine two Middle East
conflicts, the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, because each case involved one or more of the big three.
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These two cases demonstrate the shift between the big chree in
interventionist roles in out-of-area campaigns. The American
position changed from opposing to supporting out-of-area
action, while the Europeans changed from supporting to
opposing out-of-area action. The activities of the United
States, Britain, and France are emphasized in this study
mainly because of each nation's high level of involvement in
out-of-area conflicts. The roles of other alliance partners
are discussed as applicable.
A. ARTICLES 4 AND 9: AGREED INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSULTATION PROCESS
Undoubtedly, one of the major accomplishments of NATO was
the institutionalization of the interallied consultation
process as directed by Articles 4 and 9. Article 4
specifically addressed the consultation issues: "The Parties
will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them,
the territorial integrity, political independence or security
of any of the Parties is threatened." ' Furthermore, to
alleviate any ambiguity during the Washington Exploratory
Talks, it was agreed that consultation was "applicable in the
event of a threat in any part of the world. . .including a
7bThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and
Figures
,
(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 376
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threat to the security of their overseas territories . "
For obvious reasons this article was a safeguard to all w
alliance consultations on territorial concerns outside the
European theater and thus broaden the defensive domain of the
Treaty beyond the North Atlantic area. The implications of
Article 4 merely reinforced the world-wide security interests
of the NATO members. Article 4 was a deterrence mechanism
against possible Soviet intervention against NATO countries
and their out-of -Europe territories. Article 9 established a
Council to consider all matters concerned by implementation of
the treaty. The North Atlantic Council and its subcommittees
institutionalized NATO's consultation process.
In essence, how was the consultation process supposed to
function? Consultation was a process of keeping NATO members
informed by "regularly exchanging" information on a
confidential basis that pertained to any ally (for example,
77Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15, FRUS , 1949 Vol. 4. p
223 .
"Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance
,
p. 310. See also, Reid, Time of Fear and Hope
,
p. 165.
'North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures
,
p. 377. For further explanation see, Henrikson, The Creation
of the North Atlantic Alliance
, p. 310. And, Reid, Time of
Fear and Hope
, pp. 164-165. North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, NATO Handbook
,





the Suez Crisis or the Yom Kippur War) .''' In this way
consultations would enhance political cooperation and
coordination and permit the allies to participate in policy
and strategy formulation. Consultation was intended to
provide the desired result of developing common policies on
particular security concerns. It was a way for the allies to
put policies together before taking unilateral actions.
Unfortunately, on many occasions, the allies found this type
of consultation procedure to be cumbersome, slow, or
ineffective. In fact, the allies preferred to consult on an
informal basis through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic
channels instead of through the NATO process. According to
Sherwood,
. . .NATO has wisely eschewed formal cooperation beyond
Europe, fearing that it would overburden the partnership
and unnecessarily limit the autonomy of its members.
Instead, the allies have relied on an ad hoc, informal
approach to the management of developments outside the
treaty area. The organizing principle has been the
members with the interest, the will, and the capability to
take action beyond Europe in defense of Western interests
should do so, and that, where possible, they should
coordinate with one another. 51
"'NATO does not have any institutions expressly dedicated
to crises developing outside the territorial scope of the
Treaty. See Elizabeth D. Sherwood, The Out-Of-Area Debate:
The Atlantic Alliance and Challenges Beyond Europe (Santa
Monica: Rand, 1985), p. 1. NATO, Facts and Figures , p. 185.
See also, Thomas J. Kennedy, JR., NATO Politico-Military
Consultation: Shaping Alliance Decisions
,
(Washington DC,
National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 7-8.
81 Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 4
This analysis clearly illustrated that the NATO partners
preferred to form a coalition of the willing by the informal,
rather than the formal, consultations process. Sherwood added
that the informal consultation process, in fact, has produced
the most out-of-area cooperation among the allies.
Other commentators have pointed out that informal
consultations have caused problems in coordinating out-of-area
cooperation . r - In the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, a problem
with secret informal consultations was that all allies did not
agree to the planned action; the United States, which was not
consulted, objected to the intervention when it took place.
A general theme in NATO out-of-area disputes has been that
either inadequate or no consultations occurred within the
intra-Alliance forum before one or more of the allies had
taken action in a crisis. Participants in such matters
typically suggested that time did not permit allied
participation in the formulation of strategy. Formal alliance
consultation would have interrupted the development of
national security policies.
Most commentators agree that the formal consultation
process has limited value in out-of-area contingencies. Marc
Bentmck, has suggested that, even if full consultations were
conducted, it would not necessarily mean that the outcome
il;Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance: Global
Implications
,




would be a common foreign policy. Sherwood has added that
" [ t ] he sixteen members can barely manage to reach agreement on
issues pertaining to European defense..." let alone on
resolving extra-European security issues." Nevertheless,
most commentators agree that the symbolism of the North
Atlantic Council as showing the solidarity of the West could
be useful if agreement were possible on out-of-area questions.
Yet consultation procedures were not the main problem among
the allies. In fact, out-of-area disputes were caused less by
consultation breakdowns than by allied differences over
defining the threat in a particular region. '
B. INTERVENTION AND REGIONAL SECURITY: A PROBLEM OF THREAT
ASSESSMENT
Defining the threat in the Middle East has typically
troubled the allies, because the threat could have different
implications for each country. For example, in the 1956 Suez
Crisis Britain and France had different reasons to invade
Egypt. However, both countries agreed that the main issue was
a3Bentinck, " NATO' s Out-of-Area Problem ," pp. 19-23. See
also Sherwood, The Out-of-Area Debate
,
p. 9.
" 4Sherwood explains that " [ t ] he roadblocks to cooperation
are not procedural but substantive. Moreover, to the extent
that imperfect consultations are a cause of the problem, it is
not at all clear that new institutional mechanisms would be
the solution. Cooperation evolves on a case-by-case basis,
determined by mutual interests, rather than because of some
abstract commitment to consult or perfect procedural




The removal of Abdel Nasser from power. Since NATO's
inception one or more of the "big three" has been involved in
all of the major Middle East conflicts. There have been r
ma] or security reasons for Western interest in this area: (1)
to maintain the flow of oil supplies to the industrialized
economies and (2) to minimize Soviet influence in the area.
Another factor that has affected allied ability to
intervene in the Middle East has been European "entente" with
the Arab nations. This factor has allowed the British,
French, and Italians in particular certain privileges in their
relations with specific Arab nations. These unique relations
have been used on various occasions to compensate for U.S.
foreign policy errors in the region. On other occasions,
however, the insular nature of the European-Arab entente has
been used to secure the flow of oil to Western Europe alone,
as during the Yom Kippur War.
As explained earlier, the interventionist roles of the
Americans and the Europeans shifted during the late 1960s and
early 1970s. America's reluctance to participate in Middle
Eastern contingencies in the early years of NATO established
a precedent for years to come. The Europeans were willing to
intervene in pursuing their interests, particularly in the
Middle East, but the Americans disassociated themselves from
such ventures. Some observers contend that U.S. containment
'"See Bentmck, NATO's Out -Of -Area Problems, pp. 44-45
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doctrine was damaged by America's dogged anticolonial
policies. From this perspective, the conflicting national
security policies of the United States encouraged the
Europeans to retrench from their global responsibilities and
left America as the major defender of the West's world-wide
security interests. In other words, it is argue':! that
alliance intervention co-ordination in the Middle East started
on a poor foundation, and the United States did most of the
structural damage because of the influence of ant icolonialism.
C. U.S. ANTICOLONIAL SENTIMENTS: THEIR LONG-TERM
IMPLICATIONS
U.S. anticolonial sentiment had a detrimental effect on
transatlantic relations when out-of-area contingencies were at
issue during the early years of NATO. In fact, American
judgements about U.S. national interests were ambivalent and
divided. On the one hand, America clearly had taken the best
interests of colonial dependent peoples forward by advocating
the eventual independence of European colonies. On the other
hand, American national interests were strictly against
turning such colonies over to communist sympathizers.
These cross-currents and conflicting motives caused a
severe backlash in NATO's out-of-area disputes by the late
1960 's. America clearly supported its European allies v/hen it
was decided that keeping a colonial possession under European
tutelage maintained regional stability. The Americans
42
nonetheless assailed the Europeans for their unwillingness to
forgo their imperialistic past and urged decolonization. For
the United States the former policy was a realistic national
security position for maintaining regional stability on behalf
of the West. However, the latter point was an excellent
national policy position to champion when a colonial
dependency was strategically insignificant . : '
As the Cold War heightened, anti-imperialism became less
of an issue, and "it left little room for an ant icolonialism
that had no base in pragmatic considerations." 1 The United
States was extremely concerned about anti-Western and
communist-supported nationalist movements emerging in its
allies' colonial territories. Consequently, for national
security reasons in some cases continued European colonial
rule was favored over the self-determination of peoples whose
""The U.S. government first tried to appeal to
nationalist movements in a minimal way while working with the
western European Metropolitan powers in long-range,
substantive, common programs necessitating close cooperation.
Hence, American leadership continued to support the principle
of self-determination in public remarks and began quietly
pressing its European allies to adopt a process of
evolutionary development toward self-government in colonial
areas. In return for implementing such a gradualist approach,
the United States offered to use its influence, where feasible
and appropriate, to moderate the demands of nationalist groups
so that they also might accept a slow mode of decolonization.
This policy led to an American program of economic
stabilization, restoration of international trade, and forward
military installations." See Scott L. Bills, "The United
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leaders were anti-Western or communist sympathizers. For
instance, in 1949, United States policy with regard to French
North Africa opposed any form of independence for Morocco
because policy makers considered that Morocco was too weak and
"vulnerable to subsequent domination by communists." 83
However, the same memorandum stated that the foremost U.S.
policy regarding colonies was to advocate the eventual
loosening of colonial tutelage; therefore "we should not lose
sight of our policy to favor the gradual evolution of
dependent peoples toward self-government." 89 America was
thus sending conflicting signals not only to France, but also
to the rest of the Alliance's colonial powers.
It appears that American anticolonial policy tended to be
guided in three not entirely consistent directions: (1) by
opposing the independence of European colonial dependencies
that seemed likely to pursue leftist or anti-Western policies;
(2) by disassociating the United States from European
reactionary colonial policies; and (3) by encouraging European
colonial dependencies to avoid leftist or anti-Western
policies in their quest for independence. These interrelated
motives characterized the conflicting American national
security signals of "support plus restraint." In a word, the
B8See memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, United
States Policy with regard to French North Africa, March 22,
FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 685.
89 Ibid., p. 687
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United States wanted its allies to decolonize, but for global
stability reasons America tacitly supported alii- in
maintaining strategic colonial possessions. These conflicting
American foreign policies have been major problematic issues
for the allies during consultations on out -of -Europe security
interests. To define it more accurately, these conflicting
signals typically entailed the United States intervening in
the affairs of its NATO partners in colonies or the United
States disassociating itself from these colonial problems.'
Ostensibly, the United States deemed it prudent for its
own national security interests to have a NATO member in
control of certain colonial territories rather than an anti-
Western or communist-supported government. The European
allies were reluctant to abandon their colonial possessions
and resisted American attempts to persuade them to do so. This
was an important theme during the first 2 years of NATO in
the out-of-area debate. The Europeans tried to gain American
backing for out-of-area campaigns while resisting anticolonial
criticisms from the United States.'' 1
In the late 1960s the Americans increased their global
activities, while the European allies decolonized and
retrenched from global intervention. This factor put the
"'See Bills, "The United States, NATO and the Colonial








United States in the position of seeking support in its out-
of-area ventures while the Europeans turned "America's old
strict constructionist arguments against the alliance leader
now that they had been per force relieved of their over seas
responsibilities . " 92
Unquestionably, the United States was feeling the economic
strain of containment, which caused it to solicit Western
European assistance to share the burden in the world-wide
East-West confrontation. Coupled with this issue was the
problem of defining the threat in out-of-area contingencies.
These fundamental transitional trends were key elements in
determining if one or more of the alliance members had the
will to intervene in a specific out-of-area campaign.' The
following two Middle Eastern case studies will provide an
overall explanation of the aforementioned factors affecting
the out-of-area problem.
D. THE SUEZ CRISIS
The West's policy in the Middle East helped to cause the
wave of pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Egypt's President,
Gamal Abdel Nasser, was emerging as the predominant leader in
the Arab world. His ant 1 -Western views stemmed from the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (Britain, France, and the
-Ibid., p. 19
93 Ibid., p. 19
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United States) , which regulated the amount of arms sales to
the Middle East region from the West . This resulted in
Nasser's solicitation of arms from the East in 1955, which
produced his first shipment from Czechoslovakia. Moreover,
Nasser objected to the Baghdad Pact because this gave Iraq
Western support for leadership in the Arab world. Nasser's
irritation with the West climaxed when the United States
withdrew its proposal to finance the Aswan Dam project. This
resulted in Nasser unilaterally nationalizing the Suez Canal
on Uuly 26, 19 56. ^
What followed after Nasser's nationalization or the Suez
Canal was the most intensely contested out-of-area dispute
since the birth of NATO. Britain and France saw Nasser's
unilateral act as a direct "challenge to their power and
influence"." Britain was absolutely outraged with Nasser's
action for two reasons: 1) Nasser's action was a direct strike
at a British "imperialist legacy, " so London had to act
decisively or face the consequences of instability in the rest
,4Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The
Dilemmas of Security
,
(Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 18-
21. See Also, NATO, Facts and Figures
, p. 47. The essence of
the tripartite declaration of May 1950 was an attempt to
regulate the flow of arms and to stabilize the territorial
delimitation between Israel and Jordan. This was a direct
response to the U.N lifting the arms embargo in 1949. See Wm.
Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951:
Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar Imperialism
,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 583. Herbert G. Nicholas,









of its colonial territories; and 2) the Suez Canal was
symbolic of British national pride and critical for the
maintenance of trade routes and oil imports. Under no
uncertain terms, Britain was ready for war if it could not
negotiate a solution to the Suez Canal crisis and taring
"Nasser to his senses." France was even more adamant about
the problem. France's Foreign Minister, Christian Pmeau,
"argued that the West should react promptly and in
strength."" France supported Britain because it believed
that Nasser was supporting subversive actions of the National
Liberation Front in Algeria, and France was willing to assist
in removing Nasser from power. Eisenhower strongly believed
that the Suez Canal and the Nasser problem should not be
exclusively dealt with by the big three. The United States
position was one of moderation to forestall any attempt of
military action by Britain or France.'
The United States was led to believe that Britain and
France relegated the idea of "immediate use of force to the
background,
"
9{ because a tripartite statement was made on
August 2, 1956, proposing a conference of affected nations to
9faDwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging
Peace 1956-1951
,





resolve this matter.' This American assumption was the
background to one of major miscalculations in the entire
affair. On 28 July 1956, the British and French had started
to develop secret military plans to invade Egypt." This
conspiracy breached the special relationship between London
and Washington.
In October 1956 Britain and France implemented their war
plan. However, after intense political and economic pressure
from the United States, a cease fire was ordered in
November.' On December 11-12, 1956, the North Atlantic
Council convened, and the Suez Crisis was addressed by the
members. The United States was supported by Italy, Germany,
and the Scandinavian nations in criticizing the actions of
Britain and France. 1 J They expressed the view that the
''Tripartite statement on the nationalization of the
Universal Suez Canal Company, issued at London by the
government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, August 2, 1956. See, Department of State Publication,
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1956
,
(Washington
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 607.
'"'Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics
,
(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 14-15. See also,
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Israeli, British, and French use of armed force was not
provoked or justified because these countries had not
exhausted peaceful means to resolve the problem. 11 ' The
Anglo-French armed action against Egypt not only harmed
relations with the African and Asian nations, but also
fragmented the harmony and solidarity of the alliance.
Norway's Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, commented that "the
British and French action in Egypt" caused mistrust because of
the "lack of consultation and disregard of [the] NATO
treaty." 104 This poor co-ordination of national policies
jeopardized the solidarity of the alliance.
The Suez Canal crisis essentially caused a rift between
the Anglo-French governments and the United States. It also
103This was the general consensus of the statements made
during the NAC meetings but also a paraphrase of a statement
by Norway's Foreign Minister. Belgium deplored the fact that
smaller alliance nations were faced with having to choose
between the UK and France, on the one hand, and the US, on the
other. Denmark was also disappointed in the Anglo-French
action but refrained from public criticism. The Netherlands
was conciliatory and indicated that the Anglo-French motives
were not dishonorable because they were not interested in any
material gain nor had they threatened Egypt's independence.
See Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North
Atlantic Ministerial meeting to the Department of State,
December 11, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 4. p. 107. See also,
Telegram form the United States Delegation at the North
Atlantic Ministerial meeting to the Department of State,
December 12, in ibid., p. 116-122. in ibid., p. 117 Belgian
position: in ibid., p. 119, Danish position: in ibid., p. 119,
Greek position: in ibid., p. 120, Dutch position.
104Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North
Atlantic Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State,




caused the London and Paris governments to lose influence and
prestige world-wide, but specifically in the Middle East
region. Thus, the Anglo-French intervention harmed the West's
position in the Middle East and allowed the Soviet Union to
become influential with the most powerful Arab leader of the
time, Nasser." Kaplan has suggested that the Suez Canal
crisis symbolizes the complete breakdown of NATO's political
consultation process. Moreover, the consultation process was
identified as a problem in May 1956 by Secretary-General Lord
Ismay, who authorized "The Committee of Three, " a group formed
to evaluate NATO's role in non-military matters. As Kaplan
puts it, "NATO was in serious trouble when its three major
constituents were so mistrustful of each other." 1
Nevertheless, Henry Kissinger suggests that the United States
policy during this entire affair was a major mistake because:
In 1956, when faced with this choice during the British
and French attempt to seize the Suez Canal, the United
States imposed its own assessment on its allies. While
dubious about British and French military plans, I had
bitterly opposed Eisenhower Administration policy then.
I have always believed that many of our later difficulties
have stemmed from our insensitive conduct toward our
allies at that time, which both stimulated a long-
festering resentment and fostered a sense of impotence
that accelerated their withdrawal from overseas
commitments and added to American burdens. 107
105Bentinck, "NATO's Out-Of-Area Problem," p. 15. See
also Sherwood, Allies In Crisis
, pp. 88-89.
10bKaplan, NATO and the United States
, pp. 68-69.
107Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
,
(Boston: Little,
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The United States was unwilling to participate in this
venture. In fact, the Americans completely disassociated
themselves from the colonial European allies. This break in
co-operation and political solidarity was a pervasive element
that caused some Western Europeans to resent subsequent United
States attempts to solicit support in out-of-area ventures.
Yet the Committee of Three attempted to provide some measures
to avoid another debacle like the Suez Crisis.
For the alliance, deep lessons were learned from the Suez
Crisis, and the timely report in December 1956 by NATO's
Committee of Three on non-military cooperation (the "Three
Wise Men" —Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway,
and Gaetano Martino of Italy) recommended actions "for
strengthening [NATO's] internal solidarity, cohesion and
unity.
"
10t These recommendations were established to assist
NATO members to work out various disputes on economic and
political co-operation based on the premise of frequent
consultation. The Committee asserted that it was "a pressing
requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an
integral part of the making of national policy." The report
:iJSReport of the Committee of Three on non-military
cooperation in NATO, Submitted to and approved by the
Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, December




further argued that without consultation "the very existence
of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy."'
In view of this, the committee believed that alliance
members must consult on such matters as problems beyond
Europe
:
NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of
its members are not confined to the area covered by the
Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic
Community can be seriously affected by developments
outside the treaty area. -
The Wise Men report was criticized by Britain's Foreign
Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, who noted that the United Kingdom had
world-wide responsibilities and that, "if consultation
proposals meant that every member was given the right to
criticize and obstruct every decision, not much will be
accomplished.
"
m The United States Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, mentioned that consultation would interrupt the
flow of foreign policy implementation, and cautioned that it
would be attempted within reason. He added that consultation
was an obstacle and "limits our constitutional processes, " and
that for this reason, "literal application [was] not
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foreign policies of NATO members, particularly for regions
beyond Europe, muse be sound, and that "this point should be
cleared up if we wish to avoid difficulties for the Secretary
General . " -- :
Nevertheless, all members agreed that the lack of
consultation during the Suez Crisis had caused inter-alliance
problems that had escalated to unprecedented heights. This
crisis was, however,, only one of many conflicts in the Middle
East involving NATO members. In the following case we will
consider whether the Suez Canal Crisis was indeed a stepping
stone to improved alliance out-of-area co-operation in the
Middle East region.
E. 197 3 YOM KIPPUR WAR
By 1973, the European NATO allies were in a period of
world-wide retrenchment. The British had relinquished most of
their military positions in the Middle East because of budget
constraints, while the United States was in the process of
disengagement from Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, the members
of the Atlantic Alliance maintained vital interests in the
Middle East, despite divergent foreign policies, particularly
between the United States and its European partners. A major
problem was caused by the differing national polices toward
Israel after the 1967 Six Day War. The Western Europeans
11 Ibid.
,
p. 14 3 .
54
asserted that Israel should return to its pre-war borders,
whereas che United States argued for i lintaining the .status
quo
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic feared that the
possibility of escalating hostility would inevitably affect
vital oil supplies. Therefore, it was in Western European
interests to avoid jeopardizing relations with Arab nations.
On the other hand, the United States favored a policy of
supporting and guaranteeing the democratic state of Israel's
existence. In view of these complications over this out-of-
area problem, we can look back and see the making of a "Suez
in Reverse .
"
When the Yom Kippur War erupted on October 6, 1973, the
Western European allies acted in a fashion comparable to that
of the United States during the Suez Crisis. The war in the
Middle East caused disagreements between the United States and
its allies over the following questions: the United States
military resupply of Israel, the use of American bases in NATO
countries, the possibilities of an oil embargo, and the United
States policies toward the Soviet Union. The Western
Europeans attempted to disassociate "themselves from the US in
the Middle East" and by doing so, "our Allies may think they
protect their immediate economic interests, but only at great
"•"Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 135. See also, Stuart
and Tow, The Limits of Alliance
,




long term cost." 111 On both sides of the Atlantic the allies
were set in their policies toward the Yom Kippur War. No
policies were more controversial, however, than the United
States decision to resupply Israel's military arsenal.
Kissinger was reluctant in the early days of the war to
submit to Israel's insistence for massive United States
military aid. It was assumed in Washington that Israel would
easily conclude this war, as in 1967. But in the days that
followed, Israel revealed that it had taken substantial losses
and needed immediate assistance or the state of Israel was in
imminent danger of being defeated. On October 9, 1973,
General Aharon Yariv reported on Israeli television the loss
of fifty aircraft and hundreds of tanks. - Kissinger was
informed earlier that day by Israel's Ambassador, Simcha
Dmitz, of the grim news of the military disaster. The United
States agreed to give Israel full support in its fight against
Egypt and Syria. :; ' A massive airlift of material was
shipped from America to Israel, and the European allies were
outraged because of this action.
L5A statement made by Richard Nixon to Willy Brandt,
cited in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
,
p. 716.
:u,See Chaim Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in
the Middle East
,
(New York: Random House, 1984), p. 255.
117Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
, pp. 491-495
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The use of NATO air bases to resupply Israel v; >.; ::::::ai
to the United States airlift mission. 115 Therefore,
Washington argued that it was equally important for it: Lies
to support the supply efforts. In principle the allies
rejected the United States resupply policy for Israel, except
for Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany. The United
States encountered major resistance from Britain and France.
William P. Bundy explained the underlying mechanism that
generally influenced European policy during the Yom Kippur
War: "the [European] allies cared more about their oil
supplies than they did about working with US policy." 1
Hence, NATO's parallel dimensions and common interests were
overshadowed by Western Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern
oil.
For example, France continued arms sales to Arab states
during the crisis in accordance with its pro-Arab policies
since 1967. : - France's Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert,
accelerated the disassociation by "[a]ttacking the United
States for fraternizing with Brezhnev while both sides were
pouring arms into the area." iJ1 The French position was not
--"Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
,
p. 13 8.
119William P. Bundy, "Western Crisis and Consensus
Experience, " U.S. Naval War College Review
,
(November /December
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, p. 13 8.




a surprise to the United States, but Britain's opposition sent
shocks through Washington. As Sherwood puts it, " [ t ] he
British made it known that they did not want their bases in
England or on Cyprus to be used either for the airlift or
intelligence collection," an action that simply infuriated
Washington. 1 ' In the early stages of the crisis the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) supported the United Scates
resupply efforts to Israel. However, with the heightened
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the
FRG was concerned about jeopardizing the progress of its
Ostpolitik campaign. Consequently, the FRG banned United
States military flights over its territory on October 22,
1973." This resulted in United States military aircraft
having to make a 2,000-mile detour to reach Israel, because
Spain (then not a member of NATO) also denied the United
States use of its bases for Middle East operations.
Furthermore, Turkey and then Greece subsequently announced
that NATO bases on their soil were for NATO operations only.
Portugal, a reluctant partner, allowed the United States
to use base facilities for resupplymg Israel. At first
Portugal resisted United States requests for use of Lajes
airfield in the Azores. However, Portugal then attempted to
:
--Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 13 9. See also
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
,
p. 709.
JiKissinger, Years of Upheaval
,
p. 709. See also Stuart
and Tow, Limits of Alliance
, pp. 267-268.
use those facilities as leverage to gain U.S. military aid for
its ventures in Mozambique and Angola. Kissinger gave
Portugal an ultimatum to agree to certain terms or be left to
defend itself alone in this "hostile world." The next day, on
October 13, 1973, the United States v/as granted permission to
use Laijes airfield. 1" The Netherlands also supported the
United States, but their location v/as off the route for the
airlift
.
By October 15, the United States airlift to Israel was in
full operation. The Arab oil producers reacted to the United
States airlift by unilaterally reducing oil production by five
percent. This was to be followed by greater cutbacks until
Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders. This initial action was
the beginning of the oil crisis that completely stopped
shipments to the United States and the Netherlands. For the
Western Europeans the fear of Arab oil production cut-backs
increased their efforts to distance themselves from the United
States. 1 - 5 The European policy of not jeopardizing entente
with the Arab nations was indeed relatively successful. As
Robert J. Lieber explained, France and Britain were exempt
'"Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
,
p. 520. And, Sherwood,
Allies in Crisis
, p. 139.
ljSKissinger , Years of Upheaval
, p. 537.
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from cuts, and the European Community (EC) members would have
a five percent reduction each month. 1 -
During the cease-fire talks on October 24, the United
Nations Security Council negotiations came to a significant
confrontation when Moscow gave the United States an ultimatum
that suggested a joint superpower peacekeeping force in the
Middle East. Moscow added that if the United States did not
submit to the ultimatum "appropriate steps unilaterally" would
have to be taken. Washington was outraged over the Soviet
overtures, but was prepared to agree to an international force
other than the superpowers. Kissinger candidly remarked that
" [t]here was no question in my mind chat we would have to
reject the Soviet proposal."'" Meanwhile, the United States
detected increased Soviet military activity in the
Mediterranean Sea and responded by placing its military forces
on a world-wide alert . The American forces alert status was
upgraded to the highest stage of peacetime readiness: Defense
Condition III (DEFCON) . The United States action was
unilaterally taken without consultation with the NATO allies.
The British, however, were informed of the United States
world-wide alert posture shortly after DEFCON III was in
effect. The West Europeans reacted quickly to distance
themselves from the United States actions. The FRG reaffirmed
:
-' Robert J. Lieber, The Oil Decade: Conflict and
Cooperation in the West
,
(New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 17
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its position that its territory would not be a military
staging ground for United States out-of-area contingencies.
The other Western European allies followed suit and made
similar statements disavowing any connection with the United
States escalation of hostilities with Moscow. 123
The Yom Kippur War and the ensuing increases in oil prices
might have been expected to encourage Western Europe and the
United States to co-ordinate their Middle East foreign
policies. Some commentators argue that the alliance's
development of a common policy has been obstructed by the
Europeans, who were concerned with maintaining vital oil
supplies. Thus, they avoided being victimized by a possible
oil embargo and "sought salvation in national
unilateralism."'"' Western Europe criticized the United
States for doing the unthinkable, that is, possibly drawing
its allies into a United States-Soviet confrontation outside
the territorial scope of NATO. :;
The Western Europeans argued that out-of-area "[t]hreats
cannot be dealt with by expanding the geographic scope of NATO
to the Middle East." Domestic politics would undoubtedly
overrule such a proposition on both sides of the Atlantic. In
: - b Ibid., pp. 583-588; pp. 714-715.
--'Karl Kaiser, Cesare Merlini, Thierry De Montbrial,
William Wallace and Edmund Wellenstein, The European
Community: Progress or Decline? (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1983), p. 26.
li(JBentinck, "NATO' s Out-of-Area Problem," p. 16.
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fact, "[a] proposal of this kind is almost impossible to
implement, for it is not clear who is to be protected against
what." 1 ' This situation is a clear example of Europe's
retrenchment and the reversal of the tactics Washington used
in earlier decades in its campaign against out-of-area
intervention for colonialist purposes.
Throughout NATO's history Europe has been the center of
the East-West conflict. This scenario started to fade in the
1970 's with hostilities beyond Europe and around NATO's
perimeter, namely the Middle East. The Yom Kippur War was the
turning point in the out-of-area debate for the NATO partners
because Europe and the United States traded places in their
"interventionist and non-interventionist roles in the Middle
East." 1 "- The global confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union started to expand with the escalation of
proxy wars, while the European allies retrenched from their
once dominant role in global affairs. America started to
solicit European assistance in its world-wide struggle against
Soviet expansionism, but these pleas were rejected for
several reasons. The Europeans remembered American
anticolonial sentiments and how the Europeans were rebuffed in
their attempts to gain U.S. support in out-of-area campaigns.
Moreover, the embarrassment of the Suez Crisis will not be
!31 Ibid., p. 27.
132 Ibid.
,
p. 15 and 27
62
soon forgotten by the British and French. The out-of-area
dispute during the Yom Kippur War was an example of the
lingering memories of past disputes that have perpetuated the
alliance's inability to resolve this problem.
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IV. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN
EUROPEAN UNION: A POSSIBLE PARTIAL RESPONSE TO
CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS
OUTSIDE EUROPE
Operations to deal with out-of-area contingencies in the
Middle East could possibly be conducted more efficiently
through United States-WEU cooperation than under NATO
auspices. Case studies supporting this judgement include the
Western naval operations in 1987-1988 during the Iran-Iraq
war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, and in the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf war. This thesis attempts to explain why
political decision makers in the United States, Britain,
France, Germany and Italy prefer to coordinate political-
military responses in a non-NATO framework for contingencies
in the Middle East. It also shows how the United States-WEU
cooperation framework has, in contrast, been a vehicle for
successful campaigns beyond Europe in the past and could
possibly provide the answer for such operations in the future.
This thesis begins by discussing the purpose of NATO and
the entrenched belief that NATO should remain a European
security apparatus rather than become a vehicle, among others,
for defending the West's geostrategic interests beyond as well
as within Europe. Also, the thesis examines to what extent
the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy
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contribute toward NATO's inability to formulate a common
foreign and security policy for the Middle East region.
The WEU's growing role as a defense institution in Western
Europe is also examined, within the context of efforts co
develop a European security identity. The thesis concludes
that the European pillar of NATO could develop common action
under the WEU to defend Western European interests in the
Middle East.
Two recent contingencies in the Middle East (that is, the
Persian Gulf naval operations in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991)
support the argument for a systematic process of coordinating
security policies between the United States and the WEU rather
than relying on the ad hoc frameworks of the past . Even
though these two cases were successful under ad hoc
coordination, it may be argued that a United States-WEU
framework should be the first choice in future Middle East
contingencies. This section is intended to provide insight
regarding the debate between the allies during each Gulf
Crisis and the possibilities of United States-WEU linkage in
responding to future security contingencies in the Middle
East .
Last, the thesis discusses some of the problems with
United States-WEU co-ordination of politico-military ventures.
The overriding advantages of United States-WEU linkage
nonetheless outweigh the disadvantages. Therefore, United
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States-WEU linkage may be a more practical political framework
for contingencies beyond Europe than the NATO framework.
A. NATO'S RATIONALE: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST USING NATO FOR
OUT-OF-EUROPE CONTINGENCIES
It has been truly said that the real creator of NATO was
Stalin and that his successors contributed to its
continuation. However, Josef Joffe and others have argued
that United States involvement in Western European political
affairs has contributed to a cooperative security relationship
in Western Europe for over forty years. As Joffe explained:
. . .neither the Soviet challenge nor the destruction of che
European balance during World War II were powerful enough
to prompt the West Europeans to transcend their history.
Only the permanent intrusion of the United States into the
affairs of the Continent changed the terms of state
interaction to the point where West Europeans no longer
had to conduct their business in the brooding shadow of
violence. By promising to protect Western Europe against
others and against itself, the United States swept aside
the rules of the self-help game that had governed and
regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past.'
This statement is noteworthy not only because it provides
an answer as to why NATO has survived since its inception, but
also because of its suggestion that Western Europeans were
able to put past historical problems to rest and pursue
cooperative interactive relations amongst themselves. As a
result, NATO was formed as a counterbalance to the clearly
perceived strategic threat from the Soviet Union during
: ' JJosef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign
Policy
, No. 54 (Spring 1984), p. 72.
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Western Europe's economic recovery and hence prevented
European allies from being engulfed into the Soviet empire.
Meanwhile, the United States military presence on the




NATO was founded as an Alliance of democratic nations that
shared common ideals and objectives. This idea was embodied
in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, in which the allies expressed
a collective obligation to defend each other if any member was
attacked by an aggressor. This obligation, however, was not
extended to areas outside the geographic scope of the Treaty
as outlined in Article 6. Both Articles suggest that the
primary mission of the Alliance is ensuring that "military
capabilities in the Treaty area are sufficient to maintain an
adequate defence posture. " iJC From this premise we can
infer that NATO was indeed created to defend Western interests
but only in the North Atlantic area.
In regard to the out-of-area debate some commentators have
suggested that the Alliance is indeed the best framework for
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78. The reassurance of European allies that Germany will not
pursue an autonomous security policy has also been advanced as
a rationale for NATO. See the sources cited in David S. Yost,
"U.S. Military Power and Alliance Relations," Annals, AAPSS
,
517, (September 1991), p. 90. And, Michael Legge, "The Making






out-of -area contingencies since it has the military
infrastructure to support such operations. For example,
Alexander M. Haig, former Secretary of State and former
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), argued in 1980 that
many security problems concerning the Alliance arise outside
the Treaty boundaries and that opposition to using NATO forces
for out-of -Europe operations "creates an inflexibility and an
artificial constraint on alliance action that will seriously
impede the alliance's effectiveness....""
In contrast, other commentators have argued that NATO
should not be used as a world-wide military organization in
defending the West's interests. This can be attributed to the
belief that "key allies" such as Britain, France, Germany and
Italy have separate and distinct interests and policy
priorities that could be potentially harmful because of the
divisive nature of out-of-area issues, as in the Suez Crisis
in 1956 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In essence, the
separate understandings of the major allies about a certain
issue may not take into account the political considerations
of the smaller allies and could thus foster a divided
Alliance. : "
'""'Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "NATO in the 1980s: The Need
for Pragmatic Leadership, " in NATO—The Next Thirty Years , ed.
Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 441.
"Henri Simonet, "Europe and the Alliance in the Next
Decade," in NATO-The Next Thirty Years
, ed
.
, Kenneth A. Myers
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 31-40.
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Indeed, NATO is not only a military organization but also
a political alliance. Therefore, it takes a significant
effort to co-ordinate and harmonize each country's national
security interests. Some commentators have suggested that the
NATO out-of-area problem could be avoided by possibly
developing the WEU as a European defense identity and using it
in concert with the United States in joint military
contingencies beyond Europe. The reason for this is that the
European pillar of NATO could use the "WEU to provide the
institutional locus of West European security
cooperation."-- In a word, this process would allow the
European allies to use their military structure to act
independently while also maintaining their alliance with the
United States. 139
B. THE WEU-A SECURITY ORGANIZATION WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
Formed in 1948, the WEU has been a longstanding but
relatively unknown institution. Its purpose was to be a forum
for multilateral security cooperation and thus offer prospects
for fruitful solidarity. This framework of multilateral
consultations was strengthened in October 1987 when the WEU
Ministers adopted the "Platform on European Security
^'Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, European Security Bevond the
Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2 010
,
(London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 132.
''Edward Mortimer, "Solution in Search of a Problem,"
Financial Times, October 9, 1990.
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Interests." In effect, this document has had profound
implications for WEU member countries not only in developing
a European security identity, but also in coordinating
policies about out-of-area issues.
The "Platform" outlined several objectives that the WEU
was attempting to fulfill that related to matters beyond
Europe
:
• developing a cohesive European security identity and
thereby developing solidarity for the harmonization of
foreign policies;
• ensuring that the two pillars of the Alliance remain
indivisible
;
• and, concerting security interests outside Europe.-"
Therefore, the Platform is a significant document in that
it further enhances the Brussels Treaty, which already
provides a broad basis for co-ordinating policies regarding
security matters outside Europe. For example, Article 8
specifically states:
At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the
Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit
Them to consult with regard to any situation which may
constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
should arise, or a danger to economic stability . ""'"
:4 William van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis,"
Survival , Vol. 32 No. 6, (November/ December 1990), p. 521.
41 In 1948 the Brussels Pact was originally formed as an
organization designed to deter the "renewal by Germany of a
policy of aggression." However, when Germany was permitted to
accede to the Brussels Pact the Treaty was modified, see
Article II of the 1954 Protocol Modifying and Completing the
1948 Brussels Treaty in, NATO Basic Documents
, pp. 56-57.
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This article is noteworthy because it implies that members
can react to security challenges outside the European
continent:. In contrast, the NATO Treaty defines a geographic
area and because of this fact coordinating out-of-area matters
amongst the allies is problematic. The WEU, on the other
hand, has no defined geographical limitations, and hence is
able to formulate foreign policies beyond Europe in concert
with fewer complications. Indeed, the Platform set a standard
for co-ordinating security matters beyond Europe. This fact
was exemplified during the "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf in
1987 and 1988. Hence, the WEU has a "real advantage to the
Alliance in that it offers the potential for concerted action
among Europeans or ad hoc cooperation between Europeans and
their North American allies." 142
The 1987 Platform reinforced the Brussels Treaty by
reaffirming the WEU's obligation to ensure the defense of "any
member country at its borders," as the premise for concerting
West European security co-operation, which included "bilateral
and regional military co-operation.""'' Likewise, WEU
Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen noted that the Platform
:4
~Arnaud Jacomet, "The Role of WEU in the Gulf War, " in
Western Europe and the Gulf: A study of West European
reactions to the Gulf War carried out under the auspices of




, Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, (Paris: The Institute
for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), pp.
159-160.
143 Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security
Co-operation," Adelphi Papers 244, (Autumn 1989), p. 31.
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facilitated the process for members to be more effective in
contributing to the West's common security interests ;ucside
Europe.'" By all accounts the Platform was indeed a major
document for both sides of the Atlantic. Consequently, the
revitalized WEU worked with the United States in safeguarding
the West's interests by conducting naval operations in the
Persian Gulf during the 1987-1988 tanker war.
Coupled with the Platform the WEU gained momentum in
December 1991 with the conclusion of the European Council'"5 "'
meeting on the Treaty of European Union. The Maastricht
declaration acknowledged the WEU as the security institution
of the European Union and as a component for strengthening the
European pillar of NATO. The WEU members agreed that the
arrangement must be interpreted as a way in which the European
pillar can formulate common foreign and security policy and
also implement it operationally . - ; The Maastricht
declaration noted three key areas that required the WEU to
implement its operational capacity:
• developing a WEU planning organization;
144William van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 520.
14r
'The European Council brings together Heads of State and
Government and the President of the Commission. The European
Council discusses questions pertaining both to the European
Community and to European Political Cooperation at the highest
level. See, A Guide to The European Community
,
(Published by
the E.C. Delegation to the United States, 1991), p. 7.
""Declaration of the Member States of Western European
Union issue on the occasion of the 46th European Council
meeting on 9 and 10 December 1991 at Maastricht, p. 1.
72
• closer cooperation with NATO in the fields of transport,
logistics, training, and strategic surveillance;
• and disposition of military units answerable to the
WEU. :^
What is noteworthy about the idea of the WEU becoming the
defense arm of the European political union is the fact that
all of the members belong not only to the European Community
(EC) but also to NATO. Because of this, it has been argued
that the WEU should become the bridge between NATO and the EC
in consolidating foreign and security policy. 148 Before the
Maastricht declaration many commentators were skeptical of the
WEU becoming the defense arm of the EC. However, this
argument waned during the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and 1991 when




To assess the role of the WEU as a functioning security
institution its involvement in two case studies (the Persian
Gulf in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991) is discussed. This portion
of the thesis attempts to demonstrate the usefulness of the
WEU-United States linkage in co-ordinating foreign and
1991
14/ Ibid., p. 5.
148
"The Defence of Europe," Financial Times , October 31,
149Hans Bmnendijk, "How NATO + EC + WEU Can Equal
Security for Europeans," International Herald Tribune , April
2, 1991. And see, "NATO Calls for WEU to be EC's Defence
Arm," Financial Times , February 19, 1991.
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security policy to defend the West's interests in the Middle
East .
C. THE FIRST UNITED STATES-WEU AD HOC CO-ORDINATED
OPERATION: THE "TANKER WAR" OF 1987-1988
The origins of the "tanker war" date back to May 1984,
when Iraq declared a 50-mile war zone radius around the
Iranian port of Kharg Island and began making strikes against
oil tankers making port calls. Iran responded by attacking
any shipping making port calls to the Arab Gulf nations.
These actions caused understandable alarm in the international
community. However, the major oil-consuming nations learned
to live with these inconveniences."' From 1980 to 1986 the
Iran-Iraq war was remarkably contained. The stalemate between
the two adversaries posed no major threat to other countries
in the region or to the vital oil resources
.
Events rapidly changed when attacks on oil tankers began
to escalate in late 1986. : - In fact, Kuwait (a logistical
150Congressional Quarterly Inc., The Middle East , 6th ed.
(Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986), p.
92. For an account of the Iran-Iraq war see, Edgar




"''According to The Economist , "Since 1984 Iran and Iraq
between them have hit about 250 ships, including more than 180
tankers. Iraq—which has no tanker traffic to be attacked,
because its ports have been inaccessible since the war began
in 1980—now gets many of its imports through Kuwait. To
punish Kuwait for this and for subsidizing Iraq's war effort,
Iran has for several months been concentrating its attacks on
ships using Kuwait's port." See, "The Stakes in the Tanker
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supporter of Iraq) was specifically targeted by Iran. For
this reason, the Kuwaiti government sought relief from Iranian
hostility. What caused the increase of Western involvement
was the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company's request for the United
States, the Soviet Union or any nation to reflag Kuwaiti
shipping in exchange for naval protection. The United States
did not respond immediately to the request. Conversely, the
Soviet Union seized the opportunity and promptly chartered
Soviet registered vessels to Kuwait, which under these
circumstances secured Soviet naval protection. This incident
caused a response from the United States wherein it agreed to
reflag 11 Kuwaiti ships in March 1987. lS2 Otherwise, as
Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger stated, "should we not be
responsive to Kuwait's request for help, the Soviets will be
quick to supplant us," as the major protector in the Persian
War," The Economist
, May 30, 19 87, p. 39.
'"'-According to official US documents, Kuwait solicited
the US, USSR, or any other nations to reflag its oil tankers.
And the reason for the delay in the U.S. response to the
Kuwaiti government was the length of the process of assessing
the implications for U.S. national security. Some
commentators suggest that the US agreed to Kuwait's ref lagging
requests because of the Soviet chartering of Kuwaiti ships.
For a statement of policy at that time, see Michael H.
Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1987, "U.S.
Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging, " Current
Policy No. 978 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, 16 June 1987), p. 2. And also,
"Meanwhile, in Moscow..." The Economist , August 15, 1987, p.
32; and Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Co-
operation, " p . 39
.
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Gulf.- The West could not afford to allow the realization
of such a risk.
The Western strategic focus seemed to shift dramatically
with these developments. When the Iran-Iraq war was
contained, it seemed as if the allies continued with business
as usual, - but with the new United States overtures to
Kuwait and with the increased Soviet naval operations in the
Persian Gulf the allies started to express some concern.
Events escalated further when the USS Stark was hit, perhaps
inadvertently, by an Iraqi Exocet missile on May 17, 19 87.
This incident gave Washington further determination in
expediting its plans for naval escorts for the 11 reflagged
Kuwaiti vessels and for "the need to bring the Iran-Iraq war
to the promptest possible end."- The Stark incident made
the Congress bitter regarding the Administration's Persian
Gulf policies. The Congress insisted that America should ask
its allies to bear some of the burden in patrolling the
'-^Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
,
p. 178.
1,4For an assessment of the trade and military involvement
of the West European allies in the Persian Gulf region, see
Paul E. Gallis, "The NATO Allies and the Persian Gulf," in The
United States, Western Europe and Military Intervention
Overseas
, ed., by Christopher Coker, (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1988)
, pp. 37-60 .
^'-'President's Statement, 18 May 1987, in Department of
State Bulletin
, Vol. 87, No. 2124., pp. 58-59.
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Persian Gulf. The Administration accordingly pur off the
decision to escort the ships until June 1987.-
Weinberger did exactly what the Congress suggested, and on
May 26, 1987, he requested alliance support during a Defense
Planning Committee meeting in Brussels. He argued that the
Persian Gulf should be a major concern for all the allies and
a facet of NATO responsibility since most of Western Europe's
oil comes from that region and passes through sea lanes that
were then being threatened by the Iran-Iraq war. Weinberger
received a rather cool response with the exception of the
Netherlands which expressed some interest in having a role in
the Gulf. France, on the other hand, was being approached
outside the NATO framework and Britain was apparently being
non-committal on any security matter because of upcoming
elections. Aside from this, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher seemed wary about becoming entangled in such a
venture because of the criticism she received for her support
of the American bombing of Libya in 1986. The Italian Foreign
Minister, Giulio Andreotti, was quoted as opposing any
involvement with American intervention in the Gulf.
Meanwhile, Lord Carrington, NATO's Secretary-General,
"'Tacts on File
, Vol. 47. No. 2 426, 22 May 1987, (New
York: Facts on File Inc., 1987), pp. 362 and 377.
77
suggested that any effort taken by the Alliance to act in the
Gulf would contravene the Treaty."
American policy makers argued that ending the Iran- Iraq
war was of paramount importance. Richard Murphy said that,
" [s] ince the interests of the entire Western world are
involved in the [G]ulf, the United States would
welcome—indeed, expects renewed expression of public support
and assistance from our allies in Western Europe ...."' :
The United States considered that the allies could meet this
need in various forms, including:
• diplomatic channels to bring an end to the war;
• restricting the flow of arms to Iran;
• or, coordinating naval cooperation in the Persian
Gulf. - '
The reality of this matter was that the United States had
to pursue these arrangements outside the formal NATO
consultation process and try to arrange some type of co-
operation on a bilateral basis with its Western European
allies. Even under these terms the United States solicitation
lc,7 Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 177. See also,
"Weinberger Asks For Help in Gulf," New York Times , May 27,
1987. And, Edward Cody, "U.S. Seeks NATO Support for Bigger
Role in Gulf," Washington Post
, May 27, 1987. Facts on File ,
Vol. 47, No. 2428, 5 June 1987, p. 401.
^Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on May 29, 1987 by Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. "The Persian Gulf:
Stakes and Risks," Department of State Bulletin , Vol 87. No.
2124, July 1987, p. 66.
159 Ibid.
for assistance in the Persian Gulf was rejected by all of the
major Western European allies. 1
President Ronald Reagan took the opportunity of presenting
his Gulf policy during the seven-pov/er Venice Summit in June
1987, but it was poorly received. Consequently, the United
States intensified its consultations informally with Britain
and France because the formal channels were unsuccessful. The
Western Europeans looked upon the American policy in the Gulf
with apprehension because of certain risks that were involved.
For instance, the Western Europeans perceived American Gulf
policy as a means to deter Soviet encroachment, rather than to
end the Iran-Iraq war. This view was taken because Western
and Soviet interests were convergent on the point of
preventing an Iranian victory in the war. This intense debate
was ongoing even though the United States had yet to start
escorting the 11 ref lagged Kuwaiti vessels.' '
Despite the French and British wariness over American Gulf
policy, Paris and London had already committed considerable
naval assets in the region. Britain had 10 ships in the Gulf,
while France augmented its forces in late July 1987 to 15
1 Fay Wiley, "Why Europe and Japan Won't Help, " Newsweek
,
June 8, 1987, p. 35.
1L1 Sam Younger, "Europe's Middle East Conundrum," in RUSI
and Brassev's Defence Yearbook 1988
,
(London: Brassey's
Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 163. See also, James M.
Markham, "France and Britain Uneasy With U.S. Gulf Policy,"
New York Times , July 8, 1987. And, David Hoffman, "Britain
Still Weighs Mine Sweeper Aid, Fitzwater Says," Washington
Post , August 4, 1987.
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ships by ordering the deployment: of an aircraft carrier and
two frigates to the region. At the time the British and
French task force missions were to keep a close eye on their
respective nations' commercial vessels."
"
On July 20, 1987 rhe United nations Security Council
adopted resolution 598, which called for che cease-fire in the
war. Iraq complied and ceased its attacks while Iran
continued its hostile actions. Two days later the first
escorts by American naval forces began. Shortly after, the
Sridaeton was struck by a mine and this caused the United
States to start minesweeping countermeasures . Washington
requested the assistance of its European allies in mine
countermeasure warfare. Britain and France at first rejected
the American requests. However, when more mines were found,
British and French policy makers reversed their previous
decision and separately ordered minesweepers into the Gulf on
August 11, 1987. It is noteworthy that each country decided
to emphasize that it was operating independently to protect
its exclusively national interests."
^-'"They're not all wimps," The Economist , September 26,
1987.
'David Hoffman, "Britain Still Weighs Mine Sweeper Aid,
Fitzwater Says," Washington Post , August 4, 1987. See also,
"The dog that barked, but (so far) has declined to bite," The
Economist , August 15, 1987, p. 31. Gambles, Prospects for
West European Security Co-operation
, p. 39. And, Loren
Jenkins, "Europeans Send Mine Sweepers," Washington Post ,
August 12, 1987.
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Nevertheless, Britain took the lead under the WEU forum in
gathering Western European support for Gulf naval operations.
Aided by the Netherlands, the leading mine countermeasure
warfare nation in NATO, Britain orchestrated the idea of
developing European coordination in the Gulf under WEU
auspices. Consequently, on August 20, 1987, the WEU nations
held a meeting to develop a plan of action for conducting
joint operations in the Gulf. Immediately following the
meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans Van Den Broek,
reported that the Netherlands was committed to sending
minesweepers to the Gulf. This sudden move put pressure on
the Italian government to support the Gulf initiative, but the
allies were resigned to the Federal Republic of Germany's
(FRG) reluctance because of its constitutional constraints.
Details of the plan were finally worked out by September
1987. 164
Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti's objections to
operating in the Gulf were mainly founded in his insistence
that peacekeeping efforts should be orchestrated by the United
Nations. However, in early September 1987 the political
agenda changed when an Iranian speed boat shot at an Italian
commercial vessel in the Gulf. Within a few days, the Italian
Cabinet decided on independent naval operations in the Gulf
:
'j4 Sherwood, Allies in Crisis
, p. 181. And also,
Elizabeth Pond, "Dutch Ships to Gulf Signal Renewed Interest
in Western Alliance," Christian Science Monitor , August 25,
1987 .
and ordered the deployment of eight ships. Belgian officials,
on the other hand, followed the Dutch lead to operate jointly
when the final details of their deployment were coordinated
with the British. The FRG did not send forces to the Gulf,
but instead relieved other NATO naval assets that were
diverted from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Luxembourg gave
financial support to the Gulf efforts, and thus the entire
membership of the WEU was involved in these operations.-'
Interestingly, the United States-Western European Union
co-ordinated naval operations were conducted on an ad hoc
basis. However, as Sherwood noted, "the allied navies in the
gulf inevitably worked together to maximize their
effectiveness and minimize the risk to their forces. " lbt
Unquestionably, this incident was the first successful
operation that effectively demonstrated the West's ability to
work together in defense of common strategic interests in the
Middle East. Three years later, in 1990, the allies would
lb
-'Edward Cody, "Chain of Events in Persian Gulf Led
Reluctant Allies to Join U.S.," Washington Post , September 20,
1987. For a noteworthy analysis on the prospects of past and
future Alliance cooperation in out-of -area operations, see
Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies
do better?" NATO Review , No. 5 (October 1989), pp. 20-25.
Although not a member of the WEU, Norway assisted in the Gulf
operations by deploying vessels to the Channel. See a report
by NATO's Defense Planning Committee, Enhancing Alliance
Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities
in the Alliance , December 1988, pp. 43-44.




again be called upon to respond, this time with even greater
force, owing to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
D. THE SECOND UNITED STATES -WEU AD HOC CO-ORDINATED
OPERATION: RESPONDING TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
As the Cold War ended, the possibilities of an Ease-West
confrontation in the Middle East seemed far removed. For
instance, past events such as the United States-Soviet
standoff in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 or the Soviet expansion
into Afghanistan in 1979, seemed to be things of the past.
However, the emergence of new threats such as Islamic
fundamentalism, Iran's radicalism, and intra-regional conflict
contributed to instability which directly affected the West's
vital interests. On August 2, 1990, the West had to deal with
its first significant security threat in the post-Cold War
era— Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
When Iraq's forces invaded Kuwait the United States had
only eight warships in the Persian Gulf, while the aircraft
carrier USS Independence was in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile,
the USS Saratoga battle group was moving into position in the
Eastern Mediterranean. This small naval force was hardly the
means to displace President Saddam Hussein's forces from
Kuwait. Consequently, Washington's immediate response was to
initiate non-military actions by seeking a United Nations
condemnation of Iraqi aggression. However, the possibility of
military intervention was not ruled out.- President George
Bush gained quick support from his European allies on economic
sanctions via an unprecedented action when "the European
Community nations, which in previous years hesitated to
support U.S. initiatives in the Middle East, made strong
commitments [in response] to Washington's call for economic
sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait." 1 " 8
Unfortunately, Saddam was determined to maintain his
forces on Kuwait's soil. Therefore, on August 8, Bush made an
address to the nation from Washington, and said:
In the last few days I've spoken with political leaders
from the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas, and I've met
with British Prime Minister Thatcher, [Canadian] Prime
Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner.
And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from
its invasion of Kuwait
.
!
Bush consequently committed air and ground forces to be
deployed in Saudi Arabia. The President's military commitment
received unanimous support two days later from a special
meeting of the North Atlantic Council. NATO Secretary-General
Manfred Woerner made a formal statement on August 10 regarding
Kuwait's situation:
'"'Geraldine Brooks, James Tanner, Gerald F. Seib, and




"Japan, EC support Economic Sanctions," Wall Street
Journal
, August 6, 1990.
lb9 See address to the nation by President Bush from the
oval office in the White House, on August 8, 1990, The Arabian
Peninsula: US Principles
,
U.S. Department of State Bureau of
Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1292.
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[The] Ministers supported President Bush's decision to
assist Saudi Arabia and the dispatch of military forces of
the United States, the United Kingdom, and France ... They
agreed that the members of this Alliance will contribute,
each in its own way, to stopping further Iraqi military
aggression .
'
Interestingly, the United States did not appeal to NATO to
act in the Gulf militarily, but was seeking as much support as
possible by using NATO as a forum for consultation . -
Unquestionably, the positive European response was a sort of
"diplomatic revolution," because it was an absolute reversal
of previous attitudes regarding out-of-area co-ordination
between the allies, attitudes that have been so problematic
within NATO since the 1956 Suez Canal debacle. Robert K.
Olson has suggested that France, Britain, and Italy (major
European out-of-area powers) have grudgingly participated in
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East
since the 1980 's. As a result, according to Olson, the United
States has become the dominant power in protecting the West's
security interests in this region. In contrast, Olson
contends, the Western Europeans have been relegated to the
170See Secretary General Manfred Woerner's press statement
on Kuwait Situation, in NATO Review , NO. 4. August 1990, p.
10.
171Alan Riding, "NATO, Bereft of a Military Role,
Redefines Itself as the West's Political Galvanizer, " New York
Times
,
August 9, 1990. See also press Conference by Secretary
of State James Baker, Brussels, August 10. 1990, "NATO and the
Gulf Crisis" American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1990
,
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, Bureau of
Public Affairs, 1991), pp. 477-478.
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sidelines as vocal but impotent critics of United States
policy in the Middle East."
In the Gulf crisis, however, the United States received
swift and decisive diplomatic backing from its NATO allies.
NATO as a political-military organization was not officially
represented in the Gulf war, but its members were represented
as individual nations under United Nations auspices. Many
Western Europeans were criticized by the United States for
their slow military response.- This situation changed on
August 21, 1990, when the WEU forged a joint Gulf policy to
dispatch a naval task force to the Persian Gulf. Hence, on
August 22, 1990, the governments of Belgium, Spain, Greece,
Italy and the Netherlands deployed a naval task force under
WEU auspices. 174 NATO, on the other hand, retained its
formal role during the Gulf crisis and limited operations to
the "defence of NATO territory in the southern region and of
' "For an insightful historical analysis of Europe's
relations with the Middle East since 1949, see Robert K.
Olson, "Europe returns to the Middle East," American -Arab
Affairs
, Fall 1990, No. 24, pp. 46-47.
173Alan Riding, "NATO Struggling to Redefine Itself," The
New York Times , August 24, 19 90.
174John K. Cooley, "Pre-war Gulf Diplomacy," Survival
,
Vol. 33, No. 2, (March/April 1991), p. 136. See also, Howard
LaFranchi , "Europeans Forge Joint Gulf Policy," Christian
Science Monitor , August 23, 1990.
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ships and aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea. . .against milit
and terrorist threats. "-
As one commentator reported, the Gulf crisis would be a
"[t]est [of] whether Europeans have the collective •..•ill to
defend Europe's own interests or, once again, will simply '
I
the Yanks do it.'"-' 1- The difference for the allies in this
out-of-area problem was its global implications.
Consequently, the allies responded quickly with diplomatic
support for the United States and the United Nations, but were
generally slower in providing military support.
Britain, however, was overwhelmingly supportive of the
United States-led international coalition and the United
Nations resolutions. In fact, of the European allies, only
Britain expeditiously provided planes, ships, and ground
forces to the Gulf. The British public supported the idea of
going to war, and this facilitated Britain's participation in
the international coalition. Britain's role in this conflict
was outstanding compared to the level of forces furnished by
other major European allies such as France, Germany, and
Italy. 1
"
^Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," Survival
,
Vol. 33, No. 3, (May /June 1991), p. 249.
l7t
'George Melloan, "Europe Tiptoes into the Gulf Crisis,"
Wall Street Journal , August 13, 19 90.
''Louise Fawcett and Robert O'Neill, "Britain, The Gulf
Crisis and European Security, " in Western Europe and the Gulf
eds
.
, Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, (Paris: The Institute
for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), pp.
France was initially a hesitant alliance partner in
providing military support because of "doubt in Paris as to
what to do in the military realm in the wake of the
invasion." 1 In spite of France's political reservations,
it did commit naval forces to the multinational forces later
in August, and air and ground forces followed in September.
France, however, was at first determined to act independently
from the de facto leadership of the United States by
establishing its own command and control structure for not
only France but also the WEU . - Eventually this distinct
command and control structure caused operational problems for
the French air and ground forces working with the coalition
forces in the Gulf. These difficulties ultimately led France
to review its force command structure and to choose to come
under the "operational control" of the United States. 130
Germany interpreted its Basic Law or constitution as
prohibiting German forces from participating in out-of-area
141-158.
173Francois Heisbourg, "France and the Gulf Crisis," in
Western Europe and the Gulf , eds
.
, Nicole Gnesotto and John
Roper, (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western
European Union, 1992), p. 18.
17C)Howard LaFranchi , "Europeans Forge Joint Gulf Policy,"
Christian Science Monitor
,
August 23, 1990. See also Young,
"Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out -of -Area
Campaign, " p . 35
.
180David S. Yost, France and the Gulf War: Political-
Military Lessons Learned
,
(Monterey, CA., Naval Postgraduate
School, 1992)
, p. 9.
campaigns. In a word, the politicians agreed that the Basic
Law only allowed German armed forces to be used for self-
defense. However, it would appear that Germany was also
reluctant to be involved in the Gulf Crisis, because it was




Italy was initially undecided about supporting the United
Nations embargo on Iraqi oil. Fortunately, Spain, Germany,
and Italy did permit the United States to use NATO bases in
those countries, unlike in some past Middle East conflicts.
Greece maintained that its military facilities would be used
for NATO operations only, especially the bases in Crete. :
After the United States authorized the deployment of
50,000 troops, the European allies still had reservations
about military action. Ten days after Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, neither the British nor any other ally had sent ground
troops to augment the United States forces. France's
President Francois Mitterrand said: "France would like to see
the problem solved within the Arab community. If that turns
out to be impossible, France will assume its
responsibilities." Germany's Defense Minister added that his
^Ronald D. Asmus , Germany After the Gulf War , N-3391-AF
(Santa Monica, CA. , Rand Corporation, 1992), p. 4.
182George Melloan, "Europe Tiptoes into the Gulf Crisis,"
Wall Street Journal
, August 13, 1990. See also, Alan Riding,
"NATO, Bereft of a Military Role, Redefines itself as the
West's Political Galvanizer," New York Times , August 9, 1990.
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country would only replace naval vessels that were diverted to
the Gulf from the Mediterranean sea. Turkey also refused to
commit any of its ground forces to the Gulf. Woerner said
that there would be no action under NATO's integrated command
structure and that the Gulf Crisis required "[ajction of the
entire international community ." L83
As the Gulf crisis progressed, the United States called
for an increase in ground forces from not only the European
allies but also the rest of the international community. By
September 1990 the United States had committed 155,000 ground
forces in the Gulf area, and (of its NATO allies) only Britain
and France had committed ground forces, and those numbers were
relatively small. ;a4 Germany reiterated that it could not
commit military forces, but offered to increase its financial
contribution for Gulf operations. :r Nevertheless, European
alliance solidarity increased to unprecedented heights for an
out-of-area operation, and the WEU countries "decided to
reinforce their cooperation in the Gulf by extending it to air
S3R.W. Apple Jr., "U.S. Set to Blockade Baghdad's
Shipping," New York Times
, August 10, 1990. Alexander
MacLeod, "Thatcher's Gulf Move Wins Broad Support Among
British Public," Christian Science Monitor , August 13, 1990.
See also, Woerner 's comments in, NATO Review , No. 4, August
1990, p. 10.
y4Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Members to Weigh Adding
Troops to Gulf Force," New York Times , September 11, 1990.
yc,
For a concise account of Germany's foreign policy shift
and its contributions to the Gulf Crisis see Asmus , Germany
After the Gulf War
, pp. 10-19.
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and land forces." 136 Ironically, Washington still criticized
the Western Europeans for not doing enough. Bush ordered the
deployment of U.S. military forces from Europe to support the
Gulf operations, but requested that the NATO allies complete
the transfer because they were in a better position to do
so. : NATO defense ministers did agree to assist in
transporting military forces from Europe to the Gulf area. 1
In November 1990 the United States decided to deploy at
least 400,000 troops to the Gulf. Congressman Les Aspin,
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, indicated that
he was disappointed with the European performance in support
of the Gulf crisis. "Europe had not fully measured up to
expectations," said Aspin. The Europeans countered that the
Americans had some mispercept ions of their support for the
multinational force. Italy's Minister of Defence, Virginio
Rognoni , said, " [w] e consider that the European response will
3bSee, Francine S. Kiefer, "Bonn to Offer More Aid, but
No Troops, for Gulf Efforts," Christian Science Monitor
,
September 13, 1990. For increased WEU support of air and
land forces see, Howard LaFranchi, "Western Europe Bolsters
its Involvement in Gulf, " Christian Science Monitor
,
September 20, 19 90
.
:37Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Asks Allies to Help Move
Troops to Gulf," New York Times
,
November 23, 1990.
188Daniel A. Doherty, NATO "Out-of -Area " : An Historical
Perspective and Post-Cold War Potential
,
(Carlisle Barracks,
Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 66.
91
be seen to be adequate and timely ." _: ' The Gulf crisis
clearly demonstrated that NATO countries considered the Iraqi
aggression a challenge for the international community as a
whole and not mainly a problem for NATO to deal with.- 11
E. PROSPECTS FOR A WEU-UNITED STATES SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
Besides the out-of-area contingencies in the Middle East
discussed in this thesis NATO had difficulty in agreeing on
the following issues during the 1980s:
1) Trying to establish a multinational naval force during
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 to enforce the
freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz;
2) Setting up a multinational force in Lebanon in 1982-83;
3) Coordinating mine countermeasures in the Red Sea in 1984;
and
4) the retaliatory strikes on Libva bv the United States in
1986. : ' 1-
On the other hand, in 1987 West European foreign policies
began to converge on Middle East security issues . This
* :
'For Congressman Aspm's statements see, Michael R.
Gordon, "U. S. Asks Allies to Help Move Troops to Gulf," New
York Times
, November 24, 1990. For Minister of Defense
Rognoni ' s response see, "Europe and the Gulf crisis," NATO
Review
, No. 6, December 1990, p. 1. For details about the
contributions ultimately made by the Europeans, see Jacomet,




for Strategic Studies, 1991), pp. 238-242.
190Daniel A. Doherty, NATO Out-Of -Area : An Historical Per-
spective and Post-Cold War Potential
,
(Carlislie Barracks,
PA.: U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 70.
mWillem van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 523.
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resulted in the WEU ' s success in co-ordinating security policy
with the United States during the 1987-1988 "tanker war." For
this reason, some European officials have suggested that the
WEU could be the channel for co-operation between the European
political union and NATO. 1 '- This in essence would have a
bridging effect by co-ordinating the Atlantic Alliance's
European pillar and United States foreign and security policy.
Josef Joffe has suggested that the WEU has a mission but
lacks the means to implement a military operation.
Similarly, William H. Taft IV noted that the Gulf coalition
could not have completed its mission without NATO's logistical
support. This suggests that NATO has the means but no mission
for out -of -area operations.-' Thomas -Durrell Young
suggests that it would be a wasted effort for the United
States to push NATO to incorporate out-of-area missions.
"There is too much emotional baggage, particularly in Europe,
for such an eventuality and it would also most likely exclude
the one European country most interested. .
.
(i.e.,
* ,JThis idea was noted in a joint statement by Foreign
Ministers Roland Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. See David
S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity,"
Survival
, Vol. 33, No . 4 , (July/August 1991), p. 334.
'"Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of
Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival
,
(Spring 1992),
p. 47. See also, William H. Taft, IV., "European Security:




" ly4 It has been suggested that double-hatting could
possibly solve the WEU's problem. Double-hatting, as defined
by David S. Yost,
simply means forces can be earmarked for assignment to
various possible authorities in terms of operational
control, with national leaders deciding which line of
command to activate in a crisis (NATO, WEU, national,
ad hoc or even a UN mandate)
The components of the WEU's operational capability are
still being debated. But what is essential for the United
States and the WEU to work out is the dynamics of interaction
for future contingencies beyond Europe. The very fact that ad
hoc co-operation between the WEU and the United States was
successful in two recent Middle East contingencies warrants
the establishment of a formal systematic security arrangement
for future matters. 1 "' According to William H. Taft IV,
"[a]n integrated European force, interoperable with US and
other NATO forces, could be a valuable element in future
crises." 197 Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the United
•' 4Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing The Western Alliance for
the Next Out-of-Area Campaign: Linking NATO and the WEU ,
(Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 13.
^-Although double-hatting was not advocated by Yost, his
definition of double-hatting was used for ease of explanation.
Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," p. 335.
lu
'For an excellent essay on establishing institutional
links between the WEU and NATO see, Joao de Deus Pinheiro,
"The European Security Architecture: Translantic Links Remain
Indispensable," NATO Review , No. 1, (February 1991), pp. 11-
14.
197Taft, "European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf
War, " p. 11
.
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States Department of State, has suggested chat " [w] e need
collective approaches to resolve or deter regional conflicts
before they spark. We also need joint action to address those
that nevertheless erupted."''- He further substantiates chis
point by suggesting that there are various options open for
the European pillar of NATO and NATO itself in coordinating
action to address security concerns. In his view,
"cooperative operations among the United States and other
member states with the Western European Union (WEU) could
supply a valuable mechanism for tackling regional security
problems . " - '
'
'"Robert B. Zoellick, "The New Europe in a New Age:
Insular, Itinerant, or International? Prospects for an
Alliance of Values," Current Policy
, No. 1300, (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State 21
September, 1990), p. 2.
199<u Ibid., p. 3
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V. CONCLUSION
Examining the origins of NATO and its formative years
demonstrates why the out-of-area issue was a significant
problem for the member nations. This thesis concludes that
the out-of-area problem has existed since Bevin's conception
of a transatlantic alliance. The initial architects of this
pact envisaged establishing a string of regional defensive
pacts world-wide. This notion was immediately dismissed
because it seemed to be impractical; and it appeared that the
West was trying to encircle the Soviet Union.
Consequently, the transatlantic alliance was the solution
for the defense of the West. Yet, the participating
governments in the Treaty talks had differing views on
membership, coupled with the problem of defining the
geographic limits of the Treaty. This signaled the beginning
of the out-of-area debate for the North Atlantic pact. At
first the focus of the dispute was mainly a European
geographic one. However, it was soon extended to include
colonial possessions too. The participants were unable to
establish a system to deal with these issues. Hence, in the
years to come the out-of-area problem intermittently hindered
the solidarity of the strongest defensive pact in the world.
Historically, NATO's out-of-area problems were implicitly
complicated by the interrelated disputes over the consultation
96
process, American anticolonialism, and defining the threat
during interventions.
After extensive evaluation of the Suez Crisis and the Yom
Kippur War, one could conclude that the conflicting national
security policies of the United States were a primary reason
for the alliance's out-of-area problems. However, one could
also suggest that European unwillingness to abandon colonial
interests could be blamed as well. Arguably, allies on both
sides of the Atlantic must assume some responsibility for not
resolving NATO's out-of-area problem.
In view of the history behind this problem, it seems
unlikely that NATO will be able to agree on conducting extra-
European security operations in the future. This thesis has
argued that efforts to make NATO the framework for the co-
ordination of out-of-area operations seem likely to bring up
past transatlantic differences. Responding to out-of-area
security challenges through cooperation between the United
States and the WEU seems to be a more politically practical
measure than using the NATO framework. This approach to
addressing Western security concerns in the Middle East was
quite successful in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991.
Unquestionably, NATO's out-of-area problem has been
difficult to overcome. As suggested in this thesis, the
allies most capable of conducting military operations beyond
Europe have sometimes had incompatible policies on this
matter. In short, the United States and Britain have no
97
objection to using NATO for out -of -area purposes, while France
does have such objections. Germany has historically had
reservations about participating with military means in out-
of-area operations, whatever the auspices (NATO, WEU, UN,
etc.)
. Italy's participation in such operations has
typically been within the European or United Nations
dimension
.
Because of the diverse policies on the use of NATO in
contingencies beyond Europe, it would seem prudent to develop
a vehicle that was used successfully on two separate
occasions, that is, United States-WEU ad hoc cooperation in
the Middle East. Moreover, this type of cooperation between
two of the pillars of NATO is seemingly more practical
politically than through NATO itself. The allies must develop
institutional links between the WEU and NATO in order to
respond effectively to future contingencies beyond Europe. In
this way the United States and the WEU can utilize all of
their capabilities and assets to defend Western security
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